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Articles 
The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance 
Insolvency Regulation 
David A. Skeel, Jr.* 
I. Introduction 
The central assumption of bank and insurance insolvency regulation 
has long been that regulators must control every facet of the insolvency 
process. With both banks and insurance companies, regulators decide 
when to initiate an insolvency proceeding and how to dispose of the failed 
firm's assets, and they control nearly every decision in between. 1 
The explanation for this assumption is simple. Because banks, insur-
ance companies, and related financial intermediaries play an important role 
in the financial security of the citizenry, the government has a strong inter-
est in assuring their soundness and in preventing the kinds of systemic fail-
ures that led to financial devastation in the Depression. 
Unlike some academic commentators, I do not take issue with the tra-
ditional justification for regulating banks and insurance companies. I am 
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University . I owe special thanks to Michael Klausner, 
Peter Swire, and George Triantis, each of whom has endured countless conversations about this Anicle 
and has provided valuable suggestions. I also am grateful to Ken Abraham, Chris Frost, Tim Goettel, 
Saul Levmore, Ronald Mann, JohnMcCoid, Leonard Nakamura, and the panicipants at a faculty work-
shop at the University of Virginia School of Law for helpful comments; to the Olin Foundation for 
generous funding during a semester visitorship at the University of Virginia School of Law; and to 
Temple Law School for generous summer funding. 
1. Regulators' hegemony over the process sometimes puts them in an awkward position. In bank 
insolvencies , for instance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acts both as a claimant, 
because it steps into the shoes of the bank's depositors, and as a quasi-judicial entity with extensive 
discretion to determine how each claim is treated. 
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persuaded that the risk of bank runs and policyholder flight is genuine, and 
I agree that deposit insurance and other regulatory interventions play a 
necessary and important role. Moreover, it seems quite unrealistic to sug-
gest that lawmakers jettison the existing framework, given the political 
implausibility that lawmakers would shift gears so dramatically. 
Accepting the public-i nterest justification for regulatory oversight does 
not mean that regulators should control the entire process, however. Quite 
to the contrary. I hope to show in this Article that diminishing regulators' 
role in several important respects, while retaining the basic contours of the 
existing framework, would dramatically improve the effectiveness of the 
bank and insurance company insolvency process. 
The point on which much of the analysis pivots is the rule in both 
bank and insurance law that only regulators can initiate an insoivency 
proceeding . 2 If regulators were fully informed and had appropriate incen-
tives to initiate in a timely fashion, their monopoly over initiation would 
make perfect sense. Regulators' role in monitoring solvent firms does give 
them significant information, but because failures may reflect badly on the 
regulators themselves, they have strong incentives to delay taking action 
against troubled banks and insurance companies. There are good reasons 
to prefer that failures take place on someone else's watch, which seems to 
many observers to explain regulators' actions during the bank and insur-
ance insolvency crises of the 1980s. 
If regulators draw, at best, mixed reviews as initiators, to whom may 
we turn to achieve a better result? The answer, in my view, is managers. 
Managers are even better informed than regulators and are particularly well 
positioned to know when a troubled firm belongs in an insolvency 
proceeding. 
The obvious problem with turning to managers is that managers have 
precious little incentive to contribute to the initiation decision. 3 Given that 
insolvency generally means immediate termination of a manager's job and 
elimination of the value of her stock, managers will resist initiation rather 
2. For a discussion of the initiation of bank insolvencies, see infra notes 12-15 and accompanying 
text, and for insurance companies, see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
3. Managers also have traditionally been seen as part of the problem , rather than a partial solution , 
because of the historically high correlation between managerial fraud and bank and insurance 
insolvency. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469, 
507-08 (1992) (arguing that prior to 1980 local banks rarely failed absent fraud or severe 
mismanagement). Although bank and insurance insolvencies still often stem from or involve managerial 
fraud, the correlation has diminished significantly as bank and insurance markets have become more 
competitive. See id. at 509-10 (arguing that since 1980 "many, and perhaps most, bank and thrift 
failures have been attributable to stiff competition»); see also George J . Benson et al. , The Failure and 
Survival of Thrifts: Evidence from the Southeast. in F!NANC!AL MARKETS AND FINANC!AL CR!SES 305, 
376 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed. , 1991) (finding little evidence that most insolvencies were attributable to 
insider abuse). 
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than signal when the time for an insolvency proceeding has come. Yet this 
problem is far from fatal. Finance theory suggests that lawmakers, or 
banks and insurance companies themselves, could develop relatively simple 
mechanisms for realigning managers' incentives. I argue in particular that 
offering managers a "phantom debt" interest in the firm or providing a 
shareholder bonus in connection with an insolvency proceeding would give 
managers a strong incentive to contribute to the initiation decision. 
If the analysis stopped here, its conclusions could perhaps be dis-
missed as a characteristically unrealistic academic proposal. But my 
assessment of the disposition options in bank and insurance insolvency 
proceedings not only suggests several potential reforms, but it also provides 
an alternative justification for managerial initiation. 
I begin with the observation that neither bank nor insurance insolvency 
law includes a traditional reorganization option. Both rely principally on 
liquidation or third-party sales to resolve financial distress. Although 
traditional reorganization does not make sense for banks, I argue that 
managers should be permitted to propose a prepackaged purchase and 
assumption transaction-that is, a merger effected through the insolvency 
process-much as other firms can propose prepackaged reorganization 
plans under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 My analysis suggests 
that insurance insolvency law should go even further and permit a limited 
version of traditional reorganization. 
Each of these reforms would expand the range of disposition options 
and lead to better resolutions of financial distress in many cases. Such 
reforms also would enhance the effectiveness of managerial initiation. 
Because the reforms would increase managers' influence after insolvency, 
both would give managers far more reason to participate in the insolvency 
process than currently is the case. In effect, the right to propose a 
prepackaged purchase and assumption or to participate in a reorganization 
process serves as an implicit bonus to managers. As a result, managers 
could be expected to initiate insolvency proceedings, at least sometimes, 
even in the absence of more direct incentives such as the phantom debt and 
shareholder bonus approaches described above. 
I do not mean to suggest that managers should completely displace 
regulators as initiators. Regulators still could initiate, but managers also 
should have this authority, rather than giving regulators a monopoly over 
the decision. Even if managers frequently failed to initiate, the prospect 
of their occasional participation would represent an important improvement 
4. See 11 U .S.C . §§ 1121-1129(1994) . In a prepackaged bankruptcy, managers negotiate a reorg-
anization plan prior to filing for bankruptcy to minimize the length of the bankruptcy case. See 11 
U .S.C. § 1126(b) (sening forth requirements for the prebankruptcy solicitation of votes). For further 
discussion, see infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text. 
726 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76 :723 
over existing law. To be sure, managers are less likely to take systemic 
risk concerns into account in their decisions whether to initiate. But many 
failures do not raise the specter of systemic risk, and regulators could 
retain the authority to intervene in those cases that do. 
As this brief description of my proposals makes clear, I assume 
throughout the analysis that banks and insurance companies should be 
permitted to fail. 5 While this is at odds with the traditional inclination to 
forestall financial intermediary failures at all costs, it accords with the 
current nature of bank and insurance markets . As competition in these 
markets has intensified, it has become inevitable that some banks and 
insurance companies will fail as a consequence of market pressures . In 
consequence, these intermediaries are more like nonfinancial firms than 
ever before . My analysis suggests that their insolvency procedures should 
begin to reflect this transformation. 
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I briefly describe the 
regulatory structures in place for banks and bank-like entities and for 
insurance companies. I then discuss the initiation issue in Parts III and IV. 
In Part III, I analyze several of the reforms commentators have proposed 
in the banking context, as well as the changes Congress actually imple-
mented in 1989 and 1991; in Part IV, I develop my argument for giving 
managers authority to initiate an insolvency proceeding. I also conclude 
that there is no reason to deny creditors the right to initiate, although I 
would expect creditors to play a less direct role in initiation than managers. 
I turn to the disposition issue in Part V, which describes and defends my 
proposals for adding to the existing slate of disposition options. I then 
complete the analysis with a brief conclusion. 
It is perhaps worth noting that readers who are familiar with the reg-
ulatory structure of banking and insurance law and with the recent reform 
5. I also assume that the insolvencies of banks and insurance companies will continue to be 
regulated separately from other corporate bankruptcies-that is, lawmakers will retain the longstanding 
exclusion of banks and insurance companies from the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S. C. § 109 (1994). 
This continued separation seems quite likely as a descriptive matter because bank and insurance 
regulators, and perhaps even banks and insurance companies themselves, would strongly resist any 
effort to bring banks and insurance companies within the Code. Perhaps more surprisingly, given that 
several of my proposals call for bank and insurance insolvencies to be treated more like the bank-
ruptcies of other firtns, I also think the exclusion is justified on nonnative grounds. The best argument 
for bringing banks within the Bankruptcy Code is that bankruptcy judges face less of a conflict of 
interest than the FDIC does when it fixes the existence and amount of claims other than the deposit 
claims held by the FDIC itself. For insurance companies, federal Bankruptcy Code treatment would 
eliminate the jurisdictional problems that undertnine the state insurance insolvency process. In each 
case, however, perverse effects of Bankruptcy Code treatment, such as the Code's and bankruptcy 
judges' pervasive bias in favor of reorganization, would more than outweigh these benefits . By far the 
best existing commentary on the bank and insurance company exclusion is Michael I. Sovem, Section 
4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The Excluded Corporations, 42 MINN. L. REV . 171, 207-29 ( 1957) (arguing 
that both banks and insurance companies should be regulated by bankruptcy law). 
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proposals considered by Congress could skip the next two parts of the 
Article . Parts IV and V contain the heart of my analysis. For most 
readers, however , Parts II and III should prove useful, particularly given 
the surprising paucity of legal literature on bank and insurance insolvency 
issues. 6 In addition, Part III adds several new insights to previous 
assessments of the recent proposals for reform. 
II. A Brief Overview of the Regulatory Framework 
A. Banks, Savings and Loans, and Credit Unions 
To provide a backdrop for the remainder of the Article , I begin with 
a brief overview of the regulatory framework in banking and insurance, 
with a particular focus on the insolvency process. Banking is characterized 
by a dual system of regulation; a bank can obtain either a federal or a state 
charter, and state banks can choose to be members or nonmembers of the 
federal reserve system. 7 The most obvious effect of these choices is to 
determine who a bank's primary regulator or regulators will be. 
The regulators are as follows: the Comptroller of the Currency 
regulates national banks; state regulators and the Federal Reserve regulate 
6. Prior to the insolvency crisis of the 1980s, the academic literature paid almost no attention to 
inso lvency issues. In his seminal articles on financial intermediaries, for instance, Robert Clark 
devoted little more than one page to insolvency. See Robert C. Clark , Th e Soundness of Financial 
Intermediaries , 86 YALE L.J. 1, 99-100 (1976) [hereinafter Clark, Soundness]; see also Robert C. 
Clark , The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises , 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 561 (1981) ; Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies , 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 789 (1979) [hereinafter Clark, Financial Holding Companies] (each omitting detailed discussion 
of bank solvency issues). This omission is to some extent understandable, given the rarity of bank and 
insurance company failures in the decades after World War II. Yet even in the wake of the 
unprecedented number of failures in the 1980s, and the flurry of legislative activity that resulted, the 
academic literature remains surprisingly thin. 
The single most sustained treatment of the existing banking insolvency framework is by Peter 
Swire. See Swire , supra note 3, at 472 n.3. Two of Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller ' s many 
articles on banking can also be seen as focusing in significant part on insolvency-specific issues. See 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and 
Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L REV. 31 (1992) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Double Liability]; 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank 
Control, 88 COLUM. L REV . 1153 (1988) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Bank Failures]. Helen Garten 
also has written on bank insolvency issues . See Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure 
Resolution, 74 B.U . L REV . 429 (1994) . 
The literature is even thinner in the insurance context. For an extensive doctrinal treatment of 
an important insurance insolvency issue , see Stephen W , Schwab et a!., Onset of an Offset Revolution: 
The Application of Set-Offs in Insurance Insolvencies, 95 DICK. L REV. 449 (1991). 
7. For a debate as to the efficacy of dual regulation , compare Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking 
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN . L REV. 1, 12-14 (1977) (arguing that 
competition between states and the federal government for banking charters leads to efficient banking 
regulation) , with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking 
System, 73 CORNELL L REV . 677, 694-99 ( 1988) (questioning the existence of meaningful competition 
due to the effect of the Supremacy Clause). 
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state banks that choose to become members of the Federal Reserve 
system; and state regulators and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
regulate state banks that do not become members of the Federal Reserve 
8 system. 
Despite the multitude of regulators and regulatory options (which 
expand still further once we account for bank-like intermediaries such as 
savings and loans ("S&Ls") and credit unions), the regulatory framework 
is much more consistent than varied across the range of banks. Nearly 
every bank participates in the deposit insurance system, for instance, which 
currently provides a federal guaranty of up to $100,000 on any given 
account. 9 All banks also must satisfy roughly the same capital 
requirements. 10 Moreover, the trend is toward increasing rather than 
relaxing the unification of the regulatory framework. 11 
In the insolvency framework, the increasing unification is reflected, 
in a sense, in recent changes as to who has authority to initiate an 
insolvency proceeding. 12 Prior to 1991, a bank's primary regulator made 
the decisions of whether and when to commence an insolvency proceeding. 
Thus, the Comptroller made these decisions for national banks, state 
regulators or the Federal Reserve with respect to state member banks, and 
state regulators alone for nonmember banks. 13 In the wake of the 
8. See Michael Klausner , An Economic Analysis of Bank Regulatory Reform: The Financial 
Jnstitwions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991 , 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 700 n.l7 (!991). 
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 182l(a) (1994); Klausner, supra note 8, at 705-07. Federal deposit insurance 
was implemented under the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89 , 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) and the Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Other key components of the regulatory framework-
many of which, like deposit insurance, date to the New Deal-include geographical restrictions and 
limitations on the products that a bank can offer. Most importantly, the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 36(c) (1994), and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, id. § 1842(d) (the "Douglas 
Amendment"), long limited banks' ability to expand across state lines. With respect to products, the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 sought to prohibit bank affiliates from dealing in securities in order to erect 
a wall between commercial banks and investment banks. See Banking Act of 1933, id. § 24. The 
restrictions in each of these areas have been significantly eroded in recent years. 
10. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(l) (1994) ("Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall cause 
banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital 
."); 12 C.F .R. pt. 3 (1997) (setting the minimum for national banks at 8%); id. pt. 208 (setting 
the minimum for FED-member banks at 8% ); id. pt. 325 (setting the minimum for nonmember state 
banks at 8% ). 
II. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 287 
(1992) (noting that the S&Ls are now required to meet capital requirements at least as strict as those 
applied to national banks) . 
12 . Here and throughout the Article, I focus almost exclusively on federal insolvency regulation . 
Although the states have their own bank insolvency provisions, federal regulators invariably step in 
when a state-chartered bank becomes insolvent. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures , supra note 6, at 
1173 ; Swire, supra note 3, at 480. 
13 . See, e.g ., Paul W . Grace, Regulatory Seizure of Banks and Thrifts , in BANKS AND THRIFTS: 
INTRODUCTION TO FDIC/RTC RECEIVERSHIP LAW 177, 180-95 ( PLI Commercial Law and Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. 616, 1992) [hereinafter RECEIVERSHIP LAW] . 
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widespread view that state regulators deliberately stalled instead of 
responding to insolvencies of state banks, Congress gave the FDIC explicit 
authority, as part of the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, 14 to 
make the initiation decision itself with respect to any bank. 15 
The FDIC (or other regulator) has two principal choices if it initiates 
an insolvency proceeding. 16 The first, and less frequent, choice is to set 
up a conservatorship for the bank. Regulators generally use the conser-
vatorship approach to preserve the bank's assets and re-establish it as a 
viable going concern; the FDIC ordinarily serves as the bank's 
conservator. 17 
More often, regulators employ the second, more liquidation-oriented 
option, which is to put a failing bank into receivership. 18 In contrast to 
a conservatorship, where appointment of the FDIC as conservator is 
optional, banking regulation requires that the FDIC be appointed as 
receiver. 19 Because the FDIC also has an enormous stake in the 
receivership proceeding as subrogee of depositors' claims, the FDIC ends 
up wearing two different hats. The FDIC appears both as a claimant, in 
what is referred to as its "corporate" role, and as the receiver that 
determines the treatment accorded each claim and the ultimate disposition 
of the bank's assets. It is important to keep the FDIC's corporate and 
receivership roles separate because a great deal can turn on the distinction. 
14. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 , Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 
Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U .S.C.). 
15. See Grace, supra note 13 , at 180-83. In addition to its right to initiate , the FDIC has a variety 
of "superpowers" that give it special authority to avoid problematic transactions and otherwise 
sirengthen its hand in an insolYency proceeding. Perhaps the most prominent of these are its 
"D'Oench, Duhme" powers, derived from the Supreme Court's decision in D 'Oench, Duhme & Co. 
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), which enable bank regulators to defeat any claim based on an 
agreement that is not documented in the bank 's records. For a detailed description of D 'Oench, Duhme 
and the other superpowers , see Swire, supra note 3 , at 481-90. 
16. The FDIC also can provide "open bank assistance " rather than initiate an insolvency proceed-
ing if the bank is on the verge of default and assistance might forestall its failure, though Congress has 
placed significant restrictions on open bank assistance. See 12 U .S.C . § 1823(c)( 1) ( 1994) (authorizing 
the FDIC to assist an open, troubled financial instinttion) ; id. § 1823(c)(1)(A)-(C) (listing starutory 
prerequisites to providing assistance) ; see also EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING 
LAW 607 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing various forms of FDIC open bank assistance); Barry S. Zisman & 
William B. Waites, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Open Institution Assistance, in 
RECEIVERSHIP LAW, supra note 13, § 11.04, at 7, 23-25 (discussing requirements for assistance). 
17. See 12 U.S.C . § 1821(c)(2)(A); see also SYMONS, JR. & WHITE, supra note 16, at 604 
(discussing the appointment of the FDIC as conservator). 
18. See Grace, supra note 13, at 188 ("In practice, the comptroller rarely appoints a 
conservator."). 
19. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(i) (allowing discretion in both the appointment of the FDIC 
as conservator and the FDIC's acceptance of such an appointment); id. § J821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring 
both that the FDIC be appointed receiver and that it accept the appointment); Grace , supra note 13 , 
at 181 (contrasting the obligations of both the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC regarding 
receiverships and conservatorships). 
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As receiver, the FDIC has a variety of disposition options. One 
option is to simply liquidate all of the bank's assets piecemeal, distribute 
the proceeds to claimants, and, in its corporate capacity as insurer, pay off 
the bank's insured depositors. To keep the deposits intact, the FDIC also 
can "sell" the deposits to another bank in an insured deposit transfer, 
pursuant to which the FDIC pays another bank to assume the deposit 
liabilities, and then it can liquidate the bank's assets and pay its other 
creditors with the proceeds . The FDIC's third option is to transfer most 
or all of the bank's assets and liabilities to a third party in what is referred 
to as a purchase and assumption ("P&A") transaction. 20 
Regardless of which option it chooses, the FDIC disposes of the 
bank's assets quickly and often does not announce the bank's receivership 
until after it arranges the disposition. Regulators justify the speed and 
secrecy as necessary to minimize the effect of one bank's failure on other 
banks and to minimize the erosion of the bank's deposit base after it 
fails. 21 
The general regulation of, and insolvency proceedings with respect to, 
savings and loans, credit unions, and other bank-like intermediaries closely 
parallel banking regulation in most respects . Until the passage of FIRREA 
in 1989,22 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulated the most impor-
tant of these intermediaries-savings and loans. Thereafter, the Office of 
Thrift Supervision was given primary regulatory authority over savings and 
loans; the FDIC assumed authority of their deposit insurance, as with 
banks; and the Federal Home Financing Board was given the role of regu-
lating credit allocation issues. 23 In the insolvency context, the Resolution 
Trust Company (RTC) served as the FDIC's counterpart for savings and 
loans, acting as receiver for those that failed. 24 But it was dissolved by 
statute at the end of 1995, and its functions were assumed by the FDIC. 25 
In consequence, banks and savings and loans have both the same regulator 
and essentially the same regulatory framework in the insolvency context 
with which we are concerned. 
The remaining bank-like intermediaries face a roughly comparable reg-
ulatory structure, as noted above. 26 One additional aspect of savings and 
20. Each of these options can be further divided to produce a more exhaustive typology. For a 
complete description, see Barry S. Zisman & William B. Waites, Failed Financial Institution 
Transactions, in RECEIVERSHIP LAW, supra note 13, at 45, 50-58. 
21. See, e.g., Clark, Soundness, supra note 6, at 101. 
22. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. 
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections throughout the U.S.C .). 
23. For a brief overview of these developments, see SYMONS, JR. & WHITE, supra note 16, at 55 . 
24. See 12 U.S.C . § 1441a(b)(4) (1994). 
25. See id. § 1441a(m)(l). 
26. Savings banks traditionally have been most popular in the East; they generally are subject to 
somewhat lower capital requirements due to the long-term nature of their deposits, and states often 
restrict their investment options. Credit unions historically have consisted of g roups that share related 
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loans, credit unions, and savings banks that warrants brief mention is that 
many are owned by members rather than shareholders. As we shall see, 
this ownership structure is even more prevalent in the insurance context 
and will play a part in our analysis of the initiation and disposition of 
insolvency proceedings. 
B. Insuran ce Companies 
The most striking difference between banks and insurance companies 
from a regulatory perspective is that insurance companies are regulated 
almost entirely by the states, with very little federal overlayY Although 
state legislatures thus are the ultimate source of insurance law, other groups 
play an enormous role. The most important of these is the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which proposes model 
insurance provisions and engages in extensive lobbying on msurance 
issues . 28 
In the insolvency context, the vast majority of states have adopted 
either the NAIC's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act (NAIC 
Model Act), or the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. 29 The NAIC 
Model Act, 30 patterned in many respects after the statute Wisconsin 
enacted in 1967, 31 is more prominent and current, but many states still 
pattern their insolvency statutes on the Uniform Act. 32 
interests (suc h as labo r unions) and that pooled their savings. One of their chief advantages is that the 
federal government and many states give them tax exempt status. The National Credit Union 
Administration oversees federally chartered credit unions. See SYMONS, JR . & WHITE, supra note 16, 
at 50-57. 
27. State regulation appears to a certain extent to have been a historical accident. The Supreme 
Court held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), that federal regulation of insurance 
would violate the Commerce Clause and thus solidified state control for nearly eight decades . Paul was 
eventually overruled in United States v. South -Eastern Underwriters Ass 'n, 322 U.S . 533, 543-49, 553 
(1944), but Congress quickly reaffirmed state authority by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 
20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)); see also Spencer L. 
Kimball , The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 
45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 509-11 (1961) (suggesting that the insurance industry would have welcomed 
fed eral regulation in the early twentieth century had it been constitutionally permissible). 
28 . The NAIC's most prominent product is the National Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation 
Act. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. 
29. For a listing of the states that have adopted each of the statutes, see Kent M . Forney , Insurer 
In solvencies and Guaranty Associations, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 813, 817-18 nn.42-44 (1995) (listing 17 
states that have enacted the NAIC Model Act and 30 states and Washington, D .C. that have some 
version of the Uniform Act). 
30. Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act, 3 Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines 
(National Ass'n of Ins . Comm'rs), at 551-1 (Jan. 1995-July 1997) . 
31. See Wis. Stat. Ann.§§ 645.01-.90 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); see also Forney , supra note 
29, at 818 (observing that Wisconsin's statute became the "forerunner" of the NAIC Model Act); 
Spencer L. Kimball, History and Development of the Law of State Insurer Delinquency Proceedings: 
Another Look After 20 Years, S J. INS . REG . 6 (1986) (describing, in a statement by the principal 
drafter of the Wisconsin statute, the relationship between it and the NAIC Model Act). 
32. See supra note 29. 
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As with depositors in banking law, a major concern of insurance law 
is to protect the interests of policyholders . Starting in the late 1960s, in 
response to the perceived threat of federal regulation, the industry devised 
and states began to implement a guaranty fund system which, somewhat 
like deposit insurance in the banking context, guaranties payment to policy-
holders up to a specified ceiling in the event an insurance company 
becomes insolvent. 33 Guaranty funds have been established on a state-by-
state basis. Most of the funds are overseen by a board comprised of repre-
sentatives elected by member insurers , 34 and each fund protects only 
policyholders who reside within the given state .35 
Although the state guaranty funds have played an increasingly impor-
tant role in the insolvency context, only the state insurance commissioner 
has authority to initiate an insolvency proceeding.36 Assuming one or 
more of the statutory grounds for action is present, 37 the commission can 
initiate either a liquidation or a rehabilitation. Either way, the 
commissioner's office continues to exercise pervasive control because it 
serves as rehabilitator in a rehabilitation and liquidator in a liquidation. 38 
As the names suggest, rehabilitation proceedings are designed to 
stabilize and rehabilitate a troubled insurer, whereas liquidation proceedings 
provide for a relatively immediate liquidation. One respect in which the 
insurance insolvency process differs noticeably from banking insolvency is 
that insurance regulators are more likely to rehabilitate an msurance 
company than are bank regulators with banks-that 1s, regulators 
33. See, e.g., Richard Bromley, A History of the Development of the Life and Health Insurance 
Guaranty Association Model Act, in DIVISION FOR PROF'L EDUC., AM. BAR ASS'N, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY 611, 613, 637-73 (David M. Spector ed . , 1986) 
[hereinafter ABA, LAW AND PRACTICE] (describing the origins of the guaranty funds and parameters 
of coverage in the life insurance context). 
34. See id. at 643. 
35. The guaranty funds initially were based on the domiciliary of the troubled insurer-that is, 
when an insurer domiciled in a state became insolvent, that state's guaranty fund was responsible for 
protecting all of its covered policyholders, both in state and out of state. The Baldwin-United insol-
vency exposed major problems with this approach, and the NAIC changed its model guaranty fund act 
to a policyholder-based framework as a result. See Jack H . Blaine, Organization and Capabilities of 
Life and Health Guaranty Associations in the United States, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY INSOLVENCY 6-1 , 6-4 to 6-5 (David M. Spector ed., 1993) (hereinafter ABA, LIFE 
INSURAN.::E INSOLVENCY]. 
36. See, e.g. , Forney, supra note 29 , at 819 (noting that "(t]he [Iowa Insurance] Commissioner 
has the sole discretion to decide whether to undertake delinquency proceedings"). 
37. The NAIC Model Act lists 18 different grounds for initiating a rehabilitation or liquidation, 
ranging from insolvency to control of the company by a person "found after notice and hearing . . . 
to be dishonest or untrustworthy in a way affecting the insurer's business." Insurers Rehabilitation and 
Liquidation Model Act, supra note 30, § 16, at 555-17 to -19 . 
38. See, e.g., id. § 17 (commissioner to be appointed rehabilitator); § 20 (commissioner to be 
appointed liquidator). Many states also have a conservatorship option which is used to preserve an 
insurance company's assets until regulators can evaluate its status. See Schwab et al., supra note 6, 
at 451 n.3 . 
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sometimes rehabilitate the insurer rather than liquidating it or selling its 
assets to a third party. 39 
The frequency of rehabilitation should not be overstated, however. 
Even when state commissioners put a company into rehabilitation, they 
often do so simply as an interim measure to give the conunissioner's office 
a better opportunity to assess the status and prospects of a troubled 
insurer. 40 Many of these proceedings end up in liquidation, and many 
others start there. It is principally with extremely large insurers that stare 
conunissioners effect a true rehabilitation. 41 
Another difference between bank and insurance insolvencies is that 
state insurance conunissioners do not place quite so great a premium on 
speed and secrecy as their counterparts in the banking context. While 
insurance regulators are similarly concerned that a public acknowledgment 
of insolvency will lead to policyholder flight, insurance regulators do not 
ordinarily arrange in advance for the disposition of a troubled insurer's 
assets. 
C. A Brief Definitional Note 
Before turning to the particular insolvency issues we will be 
considering, I should note that I will use (and already have used) several 
simplifying terms throughout the analysis. Given the differences in termin-
ology in the bank and insurance company insolvency contexts, I will often 
use the general term "insolvency proceeding" to refer to one or more of 
the insolvency options .42 I also will refer to "bank regulators" and 
"insurance regulators" rather than specifying the particular regulator, and 
I will use "banks" as a catch-all category including both banks and bank-
like intermediaries such as savings and loans and credit unions. Finally, 
in Part V, I will characterize each of the possible disposition options in 
terms of one of three choices: liquidations, third-party sales, or 
39. Recall that banking regulators have a similar option-defined as "conservatorship" in that 
context-but that conservatorships are rare. 
40. See, e.g., Leonard Minches, Roadmap to Rehabilitation and Liquidation Proceedings, in ABA, 
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 93, 101. 
41. When Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company became insolvent, for instance, the insurance 
commissioner's office began a lengthy rehabilitation process that ultimately included the enactment by 
New Jersey of a retroactive modification of its insurance insolvency provisions to provide for policy-
holder priority. See In re Rehabilitation of Mutual Benefit Life Ins . Co ., 609 A.2d 768 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1992) (affirming the rehabilitation plan). The rehabilitation of large insurers bears an 
obvious resemblance to the "too big to fail" doctrine in the banking context, and its use to justify open 
bank assistance in cases such as Continental Illinois. 
42. I also refer to "insolvency" proceedings and insolvency options in keeping with general 
practice, despite my view that balance sheet insolvency may not be the optimal time to take action with 
respect to a troubled bank or insurance company. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 
43. 
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reorganizations. These general terms may diminish at least one source of 
distraction as we make our way through bank and insurance insolvency 
law. 
III. The Initiation Issue: Existing Law and Current Proposals 
The first step in a formal insolvency process is the initiation of an 
insolvency proceeding . In both the corporate bankruptcy and the bank and 
insurance insolvency contexts, observers have long wrestled with the issue 
of how to ensure that insolvency proceedings are conm1enced at the right 
time. Whether initiation does or does not occur at an appropriate time 
turns in large part on who-that is, which of a company's constituencies-
has authority to initiate an insolvency proceeding and what its incentives 
are for doing so. 43 
Roughly speaking, one can imagine three different models for 
initiation: (1) regulator initiation; (2) creditor (or market) initiation; and (3) 
manager initiation. In corporate bankruptcy, lawmakers have long looked 
to creditors or managers, or some combination of these parties, to initiate 
a bankruptcy case. 44 Revisions in the bankruptcy laws have often been 
designed to adjust the authority or incentives of creditors or managers to 
file a bankruptcy petition. 45 
43. Although I will focus primarily on the issue of who should initiate insolvency proceedings , 
another important issue, and one that has not received nearly enough attention , is the timing question-
that is, when an insolvency proceeding should be conunenced. In the banking context, commentators 
almost invariably assume that the initiator should act when a bank's net worth becomes zero, see, e.g., 
Sankarshan Acharya & Jean-Francois Dreyfus , Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing 
of Federal Deposit Insurance, 44 J. FIN. 1313, 1313 (1989), but zero net worth may only be a rough 
approximation of the optimal initiation time. For an exception , and a more persuasive account, see 
William W. Lang & Leonard I. Nakamura, Optimal Bank Closure for Deposit Insurers 1-3 (Jan. 1990) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (suggesting that closure is only appro-
priate when the expected return on a bank's assets is less than the expected return from an alternative 
use of the assets). Lang and Nakamura's analysis is similar in intriguing respects to George Triantis 
and Ron Daniels's characterization of bankruptcy in the general corporate context as a governance alter-
native that is available when other governance mechanisms, such as the market for control, have not 
induced a more efficient deployment of a firm ' s assets. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, 
The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 , 1102 (1995). Frank 
Buckley has argued for a somewhat different focus, suggesting (also in the general corporate context) 
that termination is appropriate when the adverse incentive costs of equity exceed those of debt. See 
F. H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 243, 257 (1992). 
44 . The current Bankruptcy Code, for instance , permits either the debtor or its creditors to file a 
bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C . § 301 (1994) (allowing voluntary petitions by debtors); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 303 (permitting involuntary petitions by creditors). 
45 . One of the goals of the current Bankruptcy Code when it was enacted in 1978 was to make 
it easier for creditors to initiate a bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File 
So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 803-04 
(1991). Despite the changes, debtors still file the vast majority of bankruptcy cases, although most 
observers believe that many, and perhaps most, cases are filed in response to creditors' actions . See 
id. 
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Although bank and insurance insolvency developed from somewhat 
similar origins, 46 lawmakers have relied exclusively on regulator initiation 
for much of this century. Thus, as discussed in Part II, only the state 
insurance commissioner can initiate an insurance receivership, and either 
the relevant bank regulator or the FDIC must initiate bank receiverships. 
In some respects, regulators are a sensible choice to initiate insolvency 
proceedings in heavily regulated industries such as banking and insurance 
because their involvement in the regulatory process gives them extensive 
information about a given bank or insurance company. Regulators ideally 
will know when a financial intermediary has encountered financial distress 
and can commence a receivership or other insolvency proceeding at that 
time. Regulators also are well positioned to consider the systemic effects 
of a bank failure rather than focusing solely on the troubled bank. 
In practice , however, the advantages of regulator initiation often prove 
more theoretical than real. Because regulators do not have a financial 
interest in any given bank or insurance company, they often have little to 
lose if they wait too long to initiate a receivership, and much to gain by 
delaying: bank or insurance company failure may reflect badly on the 
regulators, so a regulator may be better off if the failure occurs after they 
have departed. 47 
In the face of the bank and insurance failure crises of the 1980s, and 
the widespread belief that some of the damage might have been prevented 
if regulators had not waited so long to put distressed companies into insol-
vency proceedings ,48 lawmakers began to consider alternative approaches 
to the initiation issue. The most dramatic reforms proposed that, as an 
antidote to regulator inadequacies, creditors be given a much greater role 
in initiation.49 Other reforms, such as those actually adopted in the 
46 . See, e.g., Cyril B. Upham & Edwin Lamke , CLOSED AND DISTRESSED BANKS: A STUDY IN 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 30 (1934) (stating that bank receiverships were handled like those of any 
other corporation until the 1930s) . 
47 . Macey and Miller are perhaps best known for emphasizing this problem in a number of their 
articles . See, e.g. , Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, and the 
Desirability of Early Closure: A View of th e Kaye, Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank 
Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 , 1140 (1993) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Kaye, 
Scholer]; Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J . 1277, 
1294-95 (1989). 
48. See Macey & Miller, Kaye, Scholer, supra note 47 , at 1118-19, 1140 (discussing the more 
than two year delay in closing Lincoln Savings & Loan after it was insolvent and concluding that such 
delays are the primary cause of the negative consequences of bank failure); Macey, supra note 47, at 
1294 (explaining that if insolvent banks remain open there is an incentive to take extremely high risks 
since such risks are the only hope of regaining solvency). 
49 . See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 6, at 1193-1225 (arguing that banking law 
should be deregulated so depositors will have increased incentives to monitor bank risk) ; Jonathan R. 
Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and 
Empirical Arguments , 5 YALE 1. ON REG. 215, 215 ( 1988) (noting that the majority of reform proposals 
in the wake of bank failure crises are designed to encourage depositors to monitor banks). For a 
discussion of the details of several of the proposals, see infra subpart III(A). 
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banking context , were designed to retain regulator initiation but force 
regulators to act in a more timely fashion. 50 Somewhat surprisingly, few 
observers have had much to say about the role of managers in initiation . 
In the next two Parts, I consider each of the three general approaches 
and their likely efficacy in bank and insurance insolvency. I start in this 
part by discussing several of the market reforms that have been proposed 
in the bank context, each of which would entail what I have characterized 
as creditor initiation. I consider both their virtues and the substantive 
reasons why none have yet been adopted .51 I then turn to regulator initia-
tion and consider its current parameters in the banking and insurance 
contexts. In Part IV, I explore in detail the role that managers might play 
in the initiation process. 
A. Creditor Initiation: Proposals that Call for a Marker Trigger 
An obvious attraction of creditor initiation is that creditors, unlike 
regulators, have a direct financial interest in the health of a bank or 
insurance company. Several of the most prominent proposals to reform the 
deposit insurance system in banking regulation can be seen as adopting this 
kind of approach to initiation. The first of these proposals would supple-
ment federal deposit insurance with private insurance for five to ten percent 
of a bank's insured deposits .52 Proponents view partial private insurance 
as a means of injecting market pricing into the deposit insurance system 
and, more importantly for our purposes, contend that private insurers will 
have an incentive to initiate insolvency proceedings in a timely fashion in 
order to assure full recovery of their claims. 53 
50. See infra subpart III( B). 
51. This may be a good place to note that I am focusing principally on the "merits " of the 
respective alternatives , rather than on the political prospects for any given refom1. 
52. See Herbert Baer, Private Prices, Public Insurance: The Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance, 
CHICAGO ECON. PERSP. (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), Sept./Oct. 1985 , at 45, 48-49 (proposing 
a system in which the private market determines price , bur the government provides most of the deposit 
insurance). See generally Charles W. Calomiris, Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Record, ECON . 
PERSP. (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), May/June 1989, at 10, 28 (advocating a two-tier system 
of deposit insurance in which the government offers national insurance but adds local incentives to 
monitor). For an excellent summary and critique of each of the proposed deposit insurance reforms, 
see DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM : RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS VII-1 to VII-37 (1991) (hereinafter TREASURY REPORT] . 
53. My analysis of partial private insurance throughout this section will assume that deposit liabili-
ties would be treated as unsecured claims in a partial private insurance regime, as they were when the 
reform was proposed. Under the new federal depositor preference provision, 12 U .S.C. 
§ 1821 (d)(11 )(A) , deposit liabilities receive preference over all claims except for the receiver's admin-
istrative claims. Thus, private insurance would only be effective as an initiation device if the vast 
majority of a bank's liabilities were deposit liabilities (as is true with many small banks) . Otherwise, 
the possibility of depositor losses, and thus the triggering of an insolvency proceeding , would not 
become an issue until well after the bank encountered financial distress . For a more detailed discussion 
of the depositor preference provision and its significance, see infra notes 174-76 and accompanying 
text. 
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The second approach is to require banks to issue a specified amount 
of puttable subordinated debt. 54 Puttable debt ideally would introduce debt 
monitoring and thus counteract the disincentive that depositor insurance 
creates for depositors to monitor. 55 Holders of puttable subordinated debt 
could, and presumably would, put their debt back to the bank if its value 
fell below par. If lawmakers tied initiation to investors' exercise of their 
put options, insolvency proceedings might routinely be triggered as soon 
as a bank's net worth fell below zero. 56 
The puttable subdebt proposal is similar in intriguing respects to the 
stock cancellation schemes recently proposed in the corporate bankruptcy 
context. The stock cancellation proposals suggest that corporations should 
issue equity that is automatically canceled in the event the debtor defaults 
on any of its obligations. 57 As with puttable subdebt, one of the principal 
attractions of the stock cancellation proposal is that it assures a timely 
response to financial distress. 58 
The most widely noted impediment to adopting puttable subdebt, par-
tial private deposit insurance, or any other creditor initiation proposal in 
54. Puttable subo rdinated debt is debt that is explicitly subordinated to a bank 's depositors, general 
creditors, and priority creditors, and which gives holders the right to demand payment at any time. See 
Larry D . Wall, A Plan for Reducing Future Deposit Insurance Losses: Puttab/e Subordinated Debt , 
ECON. REV. ( Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) , July /Aug . 1989, at 2-3; Charles W. Calomiris & 
Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 
AM. ECON. REV. 497, 500-01 (1991) (contending that demandable debt c reates an incentive for 
depositors to monitor their banks). 
55. See generally Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 6, a t 1165 (arguing that deposit 
insurance destroys the incentive of depositors to monitor risky investments by managers) . 
56. Under Wall's approach, a bank would have 90 days to satisfy any redemption requests without 
violating its capital requirements. The bank would be put into an insolvency proceeding if it could not 
make the redemption. See Wall, supra note 54, at 3. 
Commentators also have offered several other reform proposals . First, Bert Ely and Thomas 
Petri have suggested that deposit insurance could be replaced with an elaborate framework of cross-
guarantees. See Thomas Petry & Bert Ely, Real Taxpayer Protection: Sound Deposit Insurance 
T7zrough Cross-Guarantees, PoL'Y REV. , Spring 1992 , at 25-26. Second , other commentators have 
argued for a "narrow bank" approach which would restrict at least some banks to liquid investments 
such as government securities to eliminate the existing mismatch between banks' long-term assets (e.g., 
loans) and short-term liabilities (e.g., deposits). For a discussion of these proposals and the problems 
with each, see TREASURY REPORT, supra note 52, at Vll-19, Vll-24 to VII-30. 
57. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 10 I YALE 
L.J . 1043, 1082 (1992) (proposing that a firm's equity securities will "evaporate" in the event of a 
default on obligations to senior creditors); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN . L. REV . 311 , 323-26 (1993) (describing stock cancellation 
"Chameleon Equity "). For an extensive critique of these and several other proposed corporate 
bankruptcy reforms, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy 
Theory, 1993 WISC. L. REV. 465. 
58. One interesting comparison inheres in the differences in debt monitoring of corporations, as 
compared to banks. Because automatic cancellation would require the elimination of creditors' fore-
closure rights, see Adler, supra note 57, at 332-33, it would interfere with debt monitoring . See Skeel , 
supra note 57, at 487-91. Given that deposit insurance already has significantly undermined debt 
monitoring in the bank context, on the other hand, puttable debt could improve debt monitoring of 
banks. 
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the banking context is a perceived externality problem. The creditors 
dealing with any given bank have little incentive to consider the potential 
effect of that bank's closing on other banks. Stated differently, they have 
little reason to take the possibility of a contagion effect-that is , that a 
series of bank failures could lead to a run on other, otherwise healthy 
banks-into account in initiating insolvency proceedings. 
Although one can imagine ways to address the externality issue, addi-
tional concerns emerge if we focus on how creditor initiation would affect 
the production of information under the current framework. Currently, 
banks are required to provide extensive information to regulators, but much 
of this information is not available to investors and other interested 
parties. 59 Proponents of creditor initiation suggest that, were a creditor 
initiation proposal adopted, banks would have an incentive to provide more 
information to investors, this information production would assure accurate 
pricing of bank stock and debt, and regulators could sharply curtail the 
scope of their investigations. 60 
This predicted shift in information production suggests several possible 
limitations of creditor initiation in the bank and insurance insolvency 
context. Most obviously, if banks cannot easily produce verifiable infor-
mation (for example, about the current value of their loan portfolio) for the 
market, the mispricing of private deposit insurance or puttable subordinated 
debt could significantly undermine the effectiveness of creditor initiation. 
Given that existing data raise serious questions about the pricing of bank 
securities, 61 creditor initiation would only prove effective if, as might 
plausibly be the case, the proposals forced banks to improve their produc-
tion of information to the marketplace. 62 
In addition to the issues already discussed, each of the proposed 
reforms raises further concerns of its own. 63 None of the potential 
59. The market still may register the significance of a bank examination, however. For evidence 
that the market does respond to regulatory downgrades and upgrades, see Allen N. Berger & Sally M. 
Davies, The Information Content of Bank Examinations (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Texas Law Review). 
60. See Wall, supra note 54, at 9-10. 
61. See R. Alton Gilbert, Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Theory and Evidence, ECON. REV. 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Jan./Feb. 1990, at 3, 11-17 (reviewing existing studies and 
finding that bank stock prices are inversely related to the risk assumed by the bank) . 
62. In the secured transactions context, Alan Schwartz has made the somewhat analogous argument 
that debtors would have an incentive to provide accurate information about their status, even in the 
absence of a filing system, to obtain better loan terms. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan 
Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 220 (1989). A potentially intractable problem in the banking 
context is verifying a bank's information about its assets, given the difficulty of assessing the value of 
a bank's loan portfolio. On the other hand, many of a bank or insurance company's assets and 
liabilities are quite liquid and have easily ascertainable values. 
63. One objection to partially privatizing deposit insurance is that a private insurer might initiate 
an insolvency proceeding too soon, in order to eliminate any chance of suffering losses. See TREASURY 
REPORT, supra note 52, at VII-24. Another problem is that because a private insurer could itself 
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problems or limitations undermine creditor initiation altogether. But they 
do suggest that the case for creditor initiation is a somewhat equivocal one. 
Two additional points also warrant brief comment. First, the discus-
sion thus far has focused on creditor initiation in the banking context. 
Somewhat surprisingly, these kinds of reforms do not appear to have 
received much consideration in the insurance context. This lack of consid-
eration is in part because several of the banking proposals, such as partial 
private insurance, are tied to the deposit insurance framework in banking 
law. But some of the proposals-puttable subordinated debt, for example-
would offer both similar benefits and similar limitations for insurance 
regulation. As with banking, a puttable subdebt framework would require 
insurance companies to provide significantly more information to relevant 
investors than they currently do, and such a framework is undermined by 
creditors' lack of incentive to take systemic effects into account. 
Second, the assumption throughout this analysis that any creditor 
initiation reform would need to be imposed by law raises the question of 
why, if creditor initiation would improve bank and insurance regulation, 
banks and insurance companies do not adopt this approach themselves. On 
inspection , it becomes clear that the existing regulatory framework would 
stymie efforts to implement even a superior alternative approach. Most 
obviously, the complete control regulators have over the decision whether 
to initiate insolvency proceedings makes contractual adoption of creditor 
initiation difficult or impossible. Moreover, some of the proposals, such 
as the cross-guaranty scheme, could not be implemented by an individual 
bank because they require interbank coordination and partial displacement 
of the existing deposit insurance framework. 
B. Refining Regulators' Role in Initiation 
Given that banks and insurance companies now face many of the same 
market pressures that affect other corporations, including the market for 
corporate control, one might expect a general shift toward market-oriented, 
creditor-initiation reforms of the insolvency process. Rather than making 
the dramatic shift to creditor initiation, however, lawmakers have focused 
become insolvent, it would be necessary to regulate the private insurer, perhaps by establishing capital 
requirements . See id. at VII-22. 
An important limitation of the puttable subdebt proposal, like stock cancellation in the corporate 
bankruptcy context, is that it makes much more sense for large banks than for smaller ones. See Skeel, 
supra note 57, at 481-91 (discussing the limits of stock cancellation). Most small banks have a much 
simpler capital structure and could not easily issue publicly traded subordinated debt. To be sure, the 
increasing use of structured finance suggests that the assets even of relatively small firms can be 
securitized. Moreover, large certificates of deposit can already be seen as acting somewhat like 
puttable subordinated debt in the small bank context. But it still is a large step from these examples 
to the conclusion that puttable debt would function effectively in the small bank context. 
740 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:723 
on reforming the existing framework of regulator initiation . In the banking 
context , Congress enacted detailed, prompt corrective-action legislation in 
1991 that was designed to force regulators to initiate insolvency proceed-
ings in a timely fashion. 64 The insurance industry has moved in a some-
what similar direction-toward tying regulatory action to new capital 
standards. 65 
1. Forcing Regulators' Hand in Banking Law.-In late 1991, in the 
wake of the thrift crisis and the widespread belief that regulators had acted 
too slowly in closing insolvent savings and loans, Congress passed 
FDICIA . FDICIA responded to regulator ineffectiveness by providing an 
elaborate framework of command and control provisions requiring regula-
tors to take various actions as a bank encounters financial difficulty. 
FDICIA's prompt corrective-action requirements are keyed to five 
zones of bank capital. 66 Banks in Zones 1 and 2 are deemed to meet or 
exceed appropriate capital levels, whereas Zones 3, 4, and 5 reflect 
increasingly serious undercapitalization. 67 FDICIA subjects Zone 3 banks 
to a series of mandatory sanctions, such as a requirement that the bank 
submit a feasible plan for restoring its capital to appropriate levels, and 
discretionary sanctions such as limits on growth or a requirement that the 
bank issue new equity. 68 Zone 4 banks face the same sanctions, plus 
additional, more stringent ones. Finally, the statute calls for a forced 
merger of, or appointment of a receiver or conservator for, every bank 
within Zone 5 unless regulators conclude that the public interest requires 
more lenient treatment. 69 
The FDICIA reforms are viewed by many as an appreciable improve-
ment over previous law and as an effective means of forcing regulators to 
initiate insolvency proceedings in a timely fashion70 . Even in its current 
form, however, the regulator initiation framework has significant 
limitations. For example, as is frequently noted, the touchstone of the 
64. For a thorough overview of the prompt corrective action provisions in FDICIA, see Klausner, 
supra note 8, at 760-64. 
65. See Forney, supra note 29, at 829 (describing new NAIC standards for "risk-based capital" 
which "attempt to establish action levels for state regulators based on the financial status of both life 
insurers and property/casualty insurers"). 
66. The requirements outlined below are described in more detail in Klausner, supra note 8, at 
760-64, and are codified in 12 U .S.C. § 1831o(b)(l) (1994) . 
67. See 12 U.S.C . § !831o(b)(l) (1994). 
68. See id. § 1831o(e) ("provisions applicable to undercapitalized institutions"). 
69. See id. § 1831o(h)(3)(A) . 
70. See Wayne D. Angell, Bank Capital: Lessons from the Past and Thoughts for the Future, 27 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 610 (1992) (stating that although not "a panacea," the FDICIA reforms 
are a significant improvement over the prior regulatory regime); Klausner, supra note 8, at 760-64 
(suggesting that the FDICIA provisions are an improvement because they remove the often-abused 
discretion given to regulators under the prior regulatory regime). 
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entire framework is the level of bank capital. 71 Yet bank capital calcula-
tions are notoriously inaccurate because, among other things, they are 
based on historical rather than current values. 72 The likely effect of such 
inaccuracies is to give regulators significantly more discretion as to when 
to initiate insolvency proceedings than might appear to be the case. 
The prompt corrective-action requirements counteract this tendency 
toward inaccuracy to some extent by requiring that insolvency proceedings 
be initiated when a bank's net worth falls to two percent (on the assump-
tion that a bank whose balance sheet shows assets only two percent greater 
than liabilities is likely to be insolvent in reality). 73 Nevertheless, 
regulators still have significant discretion with respect to the initiation 
decision. Early empirical evidence suggests, for instance, that banks do 
not fall into the capitalization zones that call for mandatory sanctions until 
they are already well on their way to financial distress. 74 In consequence, 
given regulators' political disincentive to close banks promptly and related 
factors such as the relationships examiners develop with managers of the 
banks they monitor, one suspects that regulators may continue to initiate 
insolvency proceedings inefficiently late-particularly in times when the 
number of troubled banks begins to rise. 
The limitation we have just considered-the possibility regulators will 
continue to act too slowly-supports the proposition that the prompt 
corrective-action structures may not work as planned. A second limitation, 
and one which appears to have been largely unnoticed, suggests the possi-
bility of inefficiency even if regulators implement the new requirements as 
71. See Klausner, supra note 8, at 765 (noting that a bank's position in the current regulatory 
scheme is determined primarily by the bank's capital level); Walter I. Conroy, Note, Risk-Based 
Capital Adequacy Guidelines: A Sound Regulatory Policy or a Symptom of Regulatory Inadequacy?, 
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2401 (1995) (stating that capital adequacy guidelines have become a 
foundation of regulatory policy). 
72. See Klausner , supra note 8, at 764-65 (suggesting that the FDICIA reforms fall short of the 
ideal because they measure capital by historical value, rather than by market value); Conroy, supra note 
71, at 2433 (noting that because capital adequacy guidelines measure the book value of a bank 's assets , 
they are unreliable in volatile economic periods because during those times the value of a bank 's assets 
can change dramatically). 
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)(3)(B) (requiring "tangible equity in an amount ... not less than 
2 percent of total assets"); Swire, supra note 3, at 488-89, 489 n.93 (attributing this approximation to 
"accounting imperfections" associated with banks' use of historical book value in reporting their 
capital) . For a caveat about the assumption that insolvency is the appropriate time to take action, see 
supra note 43. 
74 . See, e.g., DavidS. Jones & Kathleen Kuester King, The Implementation of Prompt Corrective 
Action: An Assessment, 19 1. BANKING & FIN. 491, 508-09 (1995) (finding that the zones requiring 
prompt corrective action would not include "the vast majority of troubled banks," leaving "decisions 
about whether or not to impose sanctions on these banks . . . largely up to the discretion of 
supervisors"); Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Prompt Corrective Action: Does it Make a Difference? 
( 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas ww Review) (suggesting that prompt corrective-
action thresholds are triggered too late, and arguing for adjustments to the standards or adoption of a 
different set of predictors). 
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intended. Consistent with existing practices, FDICIA invites regulators to 
require troubled banks to sell assets and to take other steps to stabilize the 
banks. To the extent bank managers are efficient liquidators of banks, as 
some commentators have assumed in the corporate bankruptcy context, 75 
forcing managers to downsize is an efficient response to financial difficulty. 
But it is not at all clear that bank managers do or will act as efficient 
liquidators . 76 
Bank managers' response to regulators' insistence that they either issue 
warrants or liquidate assets to increase capital levels is instructive in this 
respect. Bank managers frequently choose to liquidate assets rather than 
to issue warrants. 77 Perhaps liquidation outside of an insolvency proceed-
ing is the efficient alternative, 78 but the decision seems at least as likely 
to reflect an agency cost problem-managers resist measures like issuing 
warrants that would tend to dilute their shareholding interest in the bank. 
The broader point is that managerial liquidation outside of an insolvency 
proceeding may not be so attractive an option as might otherwise appear 
to be the case . To the extent managers' efforts to preserve their role lead 
them to liquidate inefficiently, a better framework might encourage earlier 
initiation of insolvency proceedings so that someone else makes the deci-
sion whether and how to liquidate bank assets (a possibility I discuss in 
detail in Part V). 
All of this discussion is simply to say that regulator initiation is 
imperfect in many respects. It does not necessarily mean, of course, that 
a better approach exists. The relative merits of regulator initiation as 
compared to creditor initiation, manager initiation, or a hybrid approach 
are issues I address below. 
2. Risk Based Capital and Guaranty Funds in Insurance Law.-
Before turning to this comparison, we first should briefly consider the 
regulator initiation framework in place in insurance law, which parallels the 
banking law approach in many but not all respects. As in banking law, the 
75. James Bowers is the most prominent proponent of this view in the corporate bankruptcy 
literature. See James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy 
Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2140-41 ( 1990) ("So long 
as debtors are the superior liquidators of certain assets in their own estates they will liquidate those 
assets themselves rather than tum the task over to a process which is less efficient. ~ ). 
76 . For a similar point in the corporate bankruptcy context, see Robert K. Rasmussen , The Ex 
Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1159, 1188 ( 1994) 
(suggesting that in order to preserve their employment with the firm , managers who remain after a 
Chapter II reorganization will support projects for which they personally are essential, even though 
these projects may be detrimental to the firm). 
77. See Telephone Interview with Leonard K. Nakamura, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia (Mar. 8 , 1996). 
78 . Even if managers are poor liquidators, for instance, the adverse signalling effects of issuing 
warrants might justify liquidating assets instead. 
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regulator initiation framework in insurance law has been widely criticized, 
in part because of a perception that insurance regulators do not deal quickly 
and effectively enough with troubled insurance companies .79 In the face 
of suggestions that insurance regulation should be federalized, state 
lawmakers have been prompted to consider their own reforms and have 
gravitated towards solutions similar to those adopted in the banking 
context. They, or more accurately, policy-making organizations, such as 
the NAIC, have proposed risk based capital restrictions that would retain 
the existing framework but attempt to impose substantially greater curbs on 
regulator discretion. 80 The restrictions would entail benefits and limita-
tions similar to the prompt corrective action provisions in banking law. 
One interesting difference with respect to the initiation of insurance 
insolvency proceedings stems from the development of guaranty funds in 
the last two decades. Each state's guaranty fund is responsible for the 
policyholders, rather than the insurance companies, that reside within the 
state, as noted earlier. Because a state's policyholders hold policies of both 
out-of-state and in-state companies, guaranty fund administrators have an 
interest in the stability of out -of-state insurance companies . Thus, we 
might expect guaranty fund administrators to monitor out-of-state insurance 
companies and, at least on occasion, to pressure regulators to initiate insol-
vency proceedings in a more timely fashion than might otherwise be the 
case. 81 
It would be a mistake to expect guaranty fund administrators to make 
an appreciable difference, however. First, and most importantly, guaranty 
fund administrators have only limited information (and access to infor-
mation) about the status of insurance companies in other states. As a 
result, they can only be expected to exert beneficial pressure in the event 
an insurance company's financial difficulties are widely known, but state 
regulators have failed to take action. Second, because guaranty funds 
provide only partial protection for depositors, guaranty fund administrators 
79. For perhaps the most widely circulated criticism of the state regulators' response to financial 
distress in the insurance industry, see SUBCOMMITIEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE 
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, !OlST CONG ., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY 
INSOLVENCIES (1990). For a more balanced assessment of insurance solvency concerns, see 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 102D CONG ., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SOLVENCY CRISIS IN 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 24-25 (1994). 
80. See, e.g., Vincent Laurenzano, Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Property and Casualty 
Insurers: Rules and Prospects , in THE FINANCIAL DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 99 
(Edward I. Altman & Irwin T. Vanderhoofeds ., 1995) . 
81. In the life insurance context, the guaranty funds act through the National Organization of Life 
and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations (NOLHGA), which is run by a nine person board of direc-
tors elected by the 52 state guaranty associations. See Blaine , supra note 35, at 6-1, 6-5. NOLHGA's 
principal role to date has been to make recommendations on disposition once an insolvency proceeding 
is initiated . See id. at 6-5 to 6-6. However, it theoretically could push for initiation in an appropriate 
case. 
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may face political backlash any time the insurance company's assets are 
insufficient to make policyholders whole. 82 Thus, they may have the 
same kinds of incentives as other state regulators to forestall initiation .83 
C. Summary and Conclusions: The Comparative Virtues of Creditor and 
Regulator Initiation 
In view of the analysis above, we now can address the question of 
how the recent reform proposals compare to regulator initiation as alter-
native approaches to an insolvency proceeding. Although the recent efforts 
to curtail regulator discretion seem likely to improve bank and insurance 
insolvency regulation, creditor initiation offers obvious benefits . For 
example, unlike regulators , who still have incentives to postpone initiation, 
creditors have a direct financial interest in responding quickly to financial 
distress . On the other hand, as we have seen, creditor initiation also raises 
several major concerns. First, particularly in the banking context, infor-
mation problems could produce significant inefficiencies in initiation. In 
addition, because creditors have limited incentives to take systemic effects 
into account, regulators inevitably would continue to play a role and would 
presumably intervene in some cases. The possibility of intervention would 
introduce additional uncertainty, which would be passed on to banks and 
insurance companies in the form of higher capital and insurance costs . 
In short, the comparative attractions of creditor initiation prove to be 
speculative on inspection. There is, therefore, a credible case for retaining 
something like the existing regime, at least as compared to the recent pro-
posals for implementing creditor initiation. 84 The final issue is whether 
an entirely different approach to initiation might prove superior to either 
of the alternatives we have considered. 
82. For instance, under the NAIC Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act, 
which has been enacted in whole or in part in 40 states, coverage is limited to $300,000 in death 
benefits, $100,000 in cash value of a policy, and $100,000 in health benefits, with a cumulative limit 
of $300,000. See id. at 6-1, 6-3 . 
83. In addition, guarantee associations tend to be thinly staffed, which undermines their ability to 
engage in any significant prefailure monitoring. See Telephone Interview with Timothy Goettel, 
Partner, Hunton & Williams (Nov. 26, 1997). 
My speculations are confirmed to some extent by a new article by Soon-Jae Lee, David Mayers, 
and Clifford Smith. See Soon-Jae Lee et al., Guaranty Funds and Risk-Taking: Evidence from the 
Insurance Industry, 44 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 1998). These authors tracked the effects of states' 
adoption of guaranty funds and found that insurance companies structured as stocks increased the riski-
ness of their assets after adoption-which suggests that the funds subsidize risk-taking. By contrast, 
the authors found no evidence that adoption led to increased monitoring. 
84 . Whether extant creditors, as opposed to the creditors that would be injected into the process 
in connection with a reform proposal, should have initiation authority is a different question. I take 
up that question, and conclude that they should, at the end of Part IV. 
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IV. Rethinking the Role of Managers in Initiation 
Given the central role that managers play in initiating corporate 
bankruptcy cases , it is striking not only that managers have almost no 
direct role in initiating bank and insurance insolvency proceedings,85 but 
also that lawmakers do not appear to have even considered the possibility 
of expanding managers' role in the initiation decision. On the contrary, 
nearly everyone seems to assume that the only two alternatives are creditor 
initiation and the current choice of regulator initiation. 
Two plausible explanations for managers' absence from the formal 
insolvency process come immediately to mind. The first, and most 
obvious, is the longstanding view that managerial misconduct is the princi-
pal cause of most bank and insurance insolvencies.86 To the extent man-
agerial fraud caused the problem, the reasoning goes, it would not make 
much sense to give managers a say in how to resolve it. While managerial 
fraud seems more prevalent in bank and insurance insolvencies than in 
other contexts , 87 the increasing competitiveness of the banking and insur-
ance markets in the past two decades has dramatically reduced the distinc-
tions between banks and insurance companies and other corporations. 88 
Due to these changes in structure, bank and insurance company failures are 
more likely than ever before to reflect the inevitable consequences of 
market competition rather than managerial defalcation. It therefore is no 
longer obvious that managers should be immediately ousted if a bank or 
insurer runs into trouble . 
The second possible explanation may be the difficulty of nafting a 
role for managers that would improve on the longstanding regulator initia-
tion approach. I will begin with this second explanation, then return to the 
issue of managerial fraud. 89 
The obvious problem with managers making, or contributing to, the 
initiation decision, is that managers appear to have even less incentive to 
act promptly than regulators, because managers usually are ousted when a 
bank or insurance company is put into receivership. 90 Thus, although 
85. This is not to say that managers currently play no part. They currently engage in extensive 
private negotiations with bank regulators in connection with the examination process. Managerial 
initiation would thus add formal authority to managers' existing role. 
86. See Swire, supra note 3, at 508 (noting that the popular perception for the cause of 1980s bank 
failures was insider fraud and abuse) . 
87. See, e.g. , Macey & Miller, Bank Failures , supra note 6, at 1166-69 (explaining how fraud 
and self-dealing are involved in up to one-third of all bank failures); Swire, supra note 3, at 510-18 
(detailing factors that may magnify the risk of insider fraud in the banking context) . 
88 . See Swire, supra note 3, at 509-10 (explaining how, following deregulation, banks were forced 
to compete with insurance companies, securities firms, and other "nonbanks" in a "newly competitive " 
market). 
89. See infra section IV(C)(2). 
90. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(F)(ii)-(iii) (1994) (authorizing Federal banking agencies 
to dismiss or replace directors and senior executive officers after initiation of insolvency proceedings). 
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managers may have better information than either creditors or regulators 
as to when the bank or insurance company has become insolvent, they have 
little reason to volunteer this information, at least under current law. 
In this Part, I consider several possible mechanisms for encouraging 
managers to contribute to the initiation decision. The first approach I 
consider would give managers an incentive to run solvent firms more effec-
tively by penalizing them in the event a bank or insurance company fails . 
I then consider a related strategy-the use of a "debt incentive" scheme 
pursuant to which managers would be required to hold debt in their bank 
or insurance company-designed to encourage them to initiate insolvency 
proceedings at an appropriate time. 
In the third section, I consider a "bonus" approach that would pay 
managers (or shareholders) a portion of the firm's going concern value in 
connection with the filing of an insolvency proceeding. As with the 
penalty and debt incentive approaches, the goal is to give managers appro-
priate initiation incentives. After concluding that both the bonus approach 
and a debt incentive that I refer to as "phantom debt" seem particularly 
attractive , I briefly reconsider the question of whether private creditors 
should play a greater role in the initiation process. 
As the overview suggests, this Part asks whether various incentive 
devices would enhance managers' incentive to contribute to the initiation 
decision . It is important to emphasize, however, that the case for manager-
ial initiation remains strong even in the absence of these devices , as we will 
see in the Part that follows. 
A. "Pure" Penalties and Managerial Initiation 
1. The Pure Penalty Approach.-Perhaps the most obvious means of 
encouraging managers to participate in initiation would be to penalize them 
for failing to do so. Giving managers the authority to initiate and 
penalizing them if they did not would encourage managers to manage more 
carefully while the firm is healthy and to file promptly in the event it runs 
into serious financial difficulties. 
A "pure" penalty approach91 of this sort is in some respects more 
attractive than the bonus approach I will defend later in the Part. Unlike 
a bonus, penalizing managers is consistent with the traditional view that 
bank and insurance insolvency almost always stems from managerial misbe-
havior and that managers therefore should not be rewarded for participating 
in the insolvency process. In addition, the penalty approach works equally 
well, at least in theory, for both stock and mutual companies-that IS, 
91. I refer to the approach discussed in this section as a pure penalty approach to distinguish it 
from the debt incentive alternative I consider in the next section. The debt incentive approach also 
penalizes managers who delay initiation, but it does so less directly . 
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differences in organizational form do not reqUire adjustments to the 
scheme. 
The most obvious initial question about penalties, as with each of the 
alternatives we will consider in this Part, is how the penalty should be 
structured . In particular, when should managers be subject to the penalty 
and how large should it be? One possibility would be to adopt a strict 
liability approach. The penalty might be triggered, for instance, whenever 
a financial intermediary's managers failed to initiate insolvency proceedings 
within a specified time of the firm's becoming insolvent. Although such 
an approach would avoid the need for a determination of fault, the diffi-
culty of pinpointing exactly when a bank or insurance company became 
insolvent raises serious doubts about the workability of such a standard . 
A more likely candidate, then, would be a penalty provision that 
required some showing of fault. Such a provision might , for instance, 
impose a penalty on managers who failed to initiate an insolvency proceed-
ing within a specified number of days of the date when they knew or 
should have known that the firm was insolvent. If the fault-based standard 
could be implemented perfectly, there would be no need to worry about 
calibrating the penalty. Because the purpose would be to ensure that mana-
gers initiate promptly, and they could avoid the penalty by doing so, the 
penalty could be infinitely large without undermining the approach. 92 The 
standard could not be implemented perfectly, of course, and would require 
difficult judgments on several issues (for example, when the managers 
should have known the intermediary had become insolvent), which suggests 
that determining how large a penalty to impose would in fact be an issue. 
Calibration questions alone do not counsel against adopting a penalty 
approach, as one can easily imagine ways of addressing them in at least 
rough fashion. 93 Yet penalties raise several other concerns which do 
undermine the approach. First, the possibility of a penalty might exces-
sively chill managers' willingness to take appropriate risks. 94 Because 
managers, unlike investors, often have most or all of their human capital 
92. By contrast, because strict liability regimes use the magnitude of the penalty to influence a 
potential violator's behavior, it is particularly important to calibrate the penalty effectively if strict 
liability rather than a fault-based standard is employed. For an excellent overview of these and related 
insights, see Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach "Willful"?: General vs. Specific Deterrence 
in Contract Remedies (Nov . 1, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) . 
93 . One possibility would be to base the penalty on the manager's salary-for example, imposing 
a multiple of two or three times her annual income. 
In addition to addressing the calibration concern, penalties also would need to ensure that 
managers did in fact bear the consequences of failing to initiate promptly. Thus, the approach would 
need to prohibit the firm from indemnifying its managers or, at the least, to subordinate any indem-
nification rights to the bank or insurance company's other creditors. 
94. At least on the margin, a penalty approach also could affect some firms' ability to attract good 
managers. 
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tied up in their bank or insurance company, they already are likely to be 
relatively risk averse. Although deposit insurance complicates this to some 
extent in banks, managers still may eschew risk, and the possibility of a 
penalty might exacerbate this. 
A second concern is whether regulators would invoke the provision in 
an appropriate fashion. The S&L crisis is not comforting on this issue. 
Although it is debatable whether regulators were justified in bringing a 
multitude of suits on negligence and fiduciary duty grounds against thrift 
managers and their attorneys and accountants, the suits often seemed moti-
vated as much by political concerns as by the defendants' behavior. 
Third, while the penalty would have a chilling effect on managers of 
a solvent bank or insurance company, it might, somewhat paradoxically, 
have little effect once a bank or insurance company did in fact encounter 
financial difficulty. Because managers have so great an investment in their 
firm, and because the firm's financial decline may often be correlated with 
a decline in their own finances, managers may be effectively incentive- and 
judgment -proof in the event financial distress actually does occur. 95 
Collectively, these concerns raise significant doubts about the efficacy 
of using pure penalties to encourage managers to initiate insolvency pro-
ceedings at an appropriate time. The other possible approaches raise 
similar concerns, but each also is in important respects more attractive than 
the pure penalty approach. 
2. Current and Historical Versions of the Penalty Approach.-In 
discussing the "pure" penalty approach, I have treated penalties as if the 
concept were new to banking and insurance law. In fact this is not the 
case. Banking law not only featured a variation on the penalty approach 
prior to the New Deal banking reforms, but recent banking reforms also 
have introduced what amounts to a penalty regime. Neither aims directly 
at managers; in part for this reason, briefly discussing them serves both as 
a useful comparison to our discussion thus far and as a segue to the debt 
incentive approach we will consider in the next section . 
The first example of penalties in action is the "double liability" that 
Congress and many states imposed on bank shareholders during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. In a double liability regime, bank 
95. It is interesting to note that, if the goal of the true penalty approach were to encourage 
managers to avoid insolvency at all costs, some of the concerns with the approach would tum out to 
be benefits. The penalty approach would encourage managers to be particularly cautious, both because 
of what they have at stake and because of uncertainties as to when the penalty would be invoked . 
Although banks and insurance companies have traditionally been seen as precisely the kinds of firms 
for which such a strategy might make sense, financial intermediaries increasingly face the same kinds 
of market pressures as other firms. This change suggests that a certain number of failures is both 
inevitable and appropriate, as with other kinds of firms. 
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shareholders could be assessed an amount up to the par value of their stock 
if the bank subsequently became insolvent. 96 The premise of double lia-
bility is that the threat of assessment will give shareholders a strong incen-
tive to monitor the bank and ensure that it is liquidated before it becomes 
insolvent so that they can avoid having to pay the additional liability. 
Although double liability disappeared after the implementation of 
deposit insurance in the 1930s, Congress has returned to the penalty 
approach theme in the banking context with its recent adoption of cross-
guaranty and "controlling company" provisions. Under the "cross-
guaranty" regulations, when a bank fails, commonly controlled banks must 
pay the FDIC an amount equal to the amount the FDIC expects to lose in 
the receivership.97 Subsequently enacted "controlling company" provi-
sions focus on the parent corporation , requiring the parent of an under-
capitalized bank to contribute the lesser of five percent of the troubled 
bank's assets or the amount necessary to restore its capital. 98 
Congress has not authorized holding companies to initiate insolvency 
proceedings themselves, an omission that could lead to unfortunate results 
in some cases, 99 but the reforms are quite promising in many other 
respects. Several benefits of the holding company obligations can also be 
seen as benefits of double liability. Because neither they nor double 
liability target managers directly, for instance, there is less reason to fear 
that either will lead to excessive risk aversion than is the case with the true 
penalty approach we considered above. 100 Both also have the advantage 
of leaving relatively little room for misapplication by regulators, because 
neither requires a nuanced consideration of managerial fault. 
But holding-company obligations can also be seen as improving on 
double liability in important respects. Not only are holding companies a 
96. Macey and Miller discuss the double liability approach in detail, and with approval, in a much-
cited article. See Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 6, at 31. 
97. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994). 
98. See id. § 1831o(e)(2). For detailed consideration of the new bank holding company 
obligations , see Howell E. Jackson , The Ecpanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies , 107 
HARV. L. REV. 507 (1994); Lissa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges 
to Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 935 (1993 ). See 
also Swire, supra note 3 at 531-37 (focusing on cross-guaranty requirements and defending them on 
public choice grounds). 
99. The possibility that the holding company obligations could misfire stems from the fact that the 
FDIC's approach has been to insist that the holding company replenish the capital of an under-
capitalized subsidiary. The FDIC's leverage comes from the assumption that holding companies will 
be unwilling to let a troubled subsidiary fail. If a holding company were willing to let a subsidiary fail, 
however, it could simply ignore the FDIC's ultimatum that it restore the subsidiary's capital. See 
Jackson , supra note 98, at 528-32. 
100. This assertion is particularly true with holding obligations because they impose a penalty on 
the holding company as a corporation, rather than on individual managers. Double liability may have 
a more significant impact on managers because managers often are substantial shareholders, especially 
in small banks. See Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 6, at 34. 
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more natural monitor than shareholders, who may be widely scattered, but 
holding company obligations also do not entail the kinds of administrative 
complexities that raised doubts about the effectiveness of double 
liability. 10 1 
Despite these benefits, the holding company approach also has signif-
icant limitations . Most obviously, holding company regulation has, by its 
very nature, a limited scope, because it only applies to banks that are part 
of a holding company system. Because holding companies control a sub-
stantial majority of bank assets at present, 102 this limitation is less 
dramatic than would otherwise be the case . Nevertheless, it gives banks 
an incentive to eschew the holding company form on the margin, and the 
percentage of bank assets that are not held by holding companies is far 
from trivial. 
Another limitation of holding company obligations, as with each of the 
penalty approaches we have considered, is that the penalty is only effective 
if the holding company or its affiliates are solvent. 103 To the extent one 
bank's financial distress reflects trouble within the holding company as a 
whole, the holding company obligations could lose much of their impact. 
Finally, holding company obligations, like the true penalty approach, 
reflect an implicit bias toward forestalling bank failure whenever possible 
rather than allowing banks to fail when they prove to be competitively 
101. The most obvious administrative difficulty with double liability is that the cost of locating and 
assessing each shareholder could often be significant , panicularly if the bank or insurance company 
were widely held. 
Commentators have criticized recent proposals to eliminate shareholders' limited liability with 
respect ro ton claims in similar tern1s. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited 
Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 424 (1992) (defending limited liability 
against alternative regimes. panicularly proponionate liability, since shareholder liability rules that 
deviate from the limited liability regime are subject to capital market arbitrage). Anticipating similar 
concerns in the double liability context, Macey and Miller have reviewed couns' responses to admin-
istrative difficulties and conclude that the couns largely devised sensible solutions. See Macey & 
Miller, Double Liability, supra note 6, at 39-48. Howell Jackson has been more skeptical of the 
benefits of double liability. See Howell E. Jackson, Losses from National Bank Failures During the 
Great Depression: A Response to Professors Macey and Miller, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 919, 921 
(1993) (suggesting Macey and Miller's data overestimate the recovery from shareholder assessments). 
But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders : A Look at 
the New Data, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 933, 936-41 (1993) (defending their previous conclusions 
against Jackson's new findings) . 
102 . See generally Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What 
a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 55, 65-68 (1995) . 
Given that the removal of geographic barriers to expansion has diminished one of the major reasons 
for adopting the holding company form, it is plausible that some banks will eschew holding companies 
at least in part to avoid holding company obligations. 
103. The likelihood that a parent or affiliate will be able to satisfy its obligations also depends 
crucially on the priority status of the obligation. If the obligation is treated as a priority claim vis-a-vis 
a parent or affiliate's other creditors, for instance, the likelihood of satisfaction will be high even if the 
parent or affiliate is insolvent . Current law subordinates cross-guaranty obligations but give priority 
to controlling company liability. 
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inviable. I will argue below that a major advantage of shifting from 
penalties to a bonus approach is that it avoids this bias. Before we turn to 
bonuses, however, we must first consider a very different kind of penalty 
approach . 
B. A "Debt Incentive" Approach to Managerial Initiation 
Our discussion of holding companies raises the question of whether it 
would be possible to design a penalty approach that focused directly on 
managers and thus avoided the built-in limitations of holding company 
obligations, but which also raised fewer concerns than a pure penalty 
approach. In this subpart, I will consider the best candidate for such an 
approach-a penalty-like strategy that I will refer to as a "debt incentive" 
approach. 104 
In concept, the approach is quite simple: it suggests that all lawmakers 
need to do is require that managers of a bank or insurance company hold 
a specified amount of its debt in addition to any stock they may hold. 
Although Professors Jensen and Meckling first suggested the approach as 
a response to agency cost issues generally, 105 it also could be used as a 
strategy for giving managers appropriate incentives for initiating insolvency 
proceedings . To show this, I will briefly explore how a debt incentive 
approach might work before turning to some of its difficulties and 
considering a variation I call "phantom" debt. 
The simplest approach-an approach that is essentially equivalent to 
the one Jensen and Meckling considered-would require that each manager 
hold a specified amount of the firm's debt. 106 Lawmakers could mandate 
that each manager hold debt in the firm in an amount equal to, say, twice 
104. I use the tenn "debt incentive" in an effort to reinforce the analogy between this approach 
and the stock incentives that publicly held corporations routinely use to enhance managers ' performance 
incentives. Whereas stock incentives encourage managers to focus on the profitability of the firm, as 
reflected in its stock value, the goal of debt incentives would be to encourage managers to initiate an 
insolvency proceeding in the event the firm encountered serious financial distress. 
105 . See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure , 3 J. FIN . ECON. 305, 352-54 (1976). My thanks to Saul 
Levmore for pushing me to consider this approach to initiation. 
106. Jensen and Meckling suggested that managers could hold an amount of debt tied to their stock 
holdings in the firm. !d. For instance, a manager's debt holdings could be keyed to a simple formula 
such as D,,/S"' = D,,S,, in which D"' is the value of the manager's debt, S, is the value of her stock, 
D, is the value of all of the firm 's debt, and S, is the value of all of its stock. From an agency cost 
perspective, the beauty of the formula is that it eliminates a manager' s incentive to divert value from 
debtholders to stockholders, because enhancing stock value in this fashion necessarily impairs the value 
of the manager's debt to precisely the same extent. Extending the analysis to the insolvency proceeding 
context, managers would have an incentive to initiate an insolvency proceeding if the value of the firm's 
debt began to decline without an offsetting increase in stock value. (This is because such a decline 
would reflect the onset of financial distress, rather than simply a redistribution of value from debt-
holders to shareholders.) 
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her annual salary or in a fixed amount tied to the size of the firm. 107 If 
a manager were required to hold a substantial amount of her net worth in 
debt, she theoretically would have a strong incentive to initiate insolvency 
proceedings if financial distress began to impair the value of her debt, and 
the prospects for reversing the firm's fortunes were bleak. 
Notice that this approach would function much like the puttable debt 
proposal discussed earlier. 108 As such, it has several significant 
attractions. Not only does it target the party that is likely to have the best 
information about the status of the firm-its managers-but also it functions 
automatically, without requiring (as a true penalty would) regulators to 
trigger its effects. Moreover, that the debt incentive approach focuses on 
managers rather than outside creditors gives it an important advantage over 
puttable subdebt. Recall that one concern with puttable subdebt stems from 
questions as to whether the market would accurately price bank or insur-
ance debt. 109 Market pricing is much less important in a debt incentive 
scheme because the incentive is based on managers' view as to the likely 
recovery on the debt in the event of a liquidation. Thus, to the extent 
managers have better information than the market, the debt incentive could 
function effectively even if the market misprices the firm's debt. 110 
In concept, then, requiring managers to hold debt is a promising 
means of encouraging managerial initiation. On inspection, the picture is 
somewhat more complicated, however. One concern with requiring mana-
gers to hold debt is the difficulty managers might have in maintaining a 
large, inaccessible investment in the firm. One can easily imagine the 
hardship to a small bank's manager of an obligation to hold, for instance, 
$500,000 of the firm's debt. An obvious solution to this difficulty would 
be for managers who had a liquidity problem to borrow the necessary 
amount, but injecting a lender into the process could interfere with 
managers' incentives to respond to fluctuations in the value of the debt. 
If the loan were secured by the debt, for instance, the lender rather than 
the manager herself would in a sense become the principal monitor. 
The second concern is evasion. In its most obvious form, if law-
makers required managers to acquire a specified amount of debt but did not 
impose an ongoing requirement to hold the debt, managers could simply 
107. This approach would have many of the same benefits and problems as employing the propor-
tional approach recommended by Jensen and Meckling. One benefit of this version , as compared to 
a strict proportional approach, is that the managers of a publicly held firm may own a small enough 
percentage of the firm's stock that the debt holding requirement would not be sufficient to counteract 
their incentive to forestall initiation . 
108. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
I 09. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
110. Notice, too , that taking holding company issues into account appears to reinforce the value 
of the debt incentive approach. Unlike holding company obligations , the debt incentive strategy applies 
equally well both within and outside of the holding company structure. 
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cash out their position or replace it with equity once they had satisfied the 
initial obligation . 111 But even requiring managers to maintain a specified 
debt holding would not eliminate the prospect of evasion. The manager or 
the firm's other shareholders could adjust the manager's salary in such a 
way as to counteract the effect of her debt holding .112 Structuring the 
obligation to minimize the risk of evasion obviously would complicate the 
approach. 
A third concern involves the managers' employment relationship with 
the firm. Through her salary and, more generally, her human capital 
stake, a manager already has what amounts to a debt claim against the 
value of the firm. To the extent these factors already make managers risk 
averse, superimposing an additional debt holding obligation could exacer-
bate the tendency. In the banking and, to a somewhat lesser extent , the 
insurance context, depositor and policyholder protections make managerial 
risk aversion somewhat less likely, because risktaking is partially subsi-
dized by the deposit insurance system. Yet the concern remains. 
Interestingly, a simple twist on the debt incentive approach could 
address several of the concerns we have just considered. Rather than 
requiring managers to actually purchase debt of the firm, lawmakers could 
provide for the issuance of phantom debt to managers. Thus, the firm 
might issue managers a debt interest that would become an actual claim 
against the firm only in the event of an insolvency proceeding .113 
Phantom debt would provide nearly all of the same benefits as actual 
debt. Thus, if a manager were given a phantom debt interest in her firm, 
a decline of the firm's fortunes would diminish the manager's expected 
return in the event of an insolvency proceeding. Therefore, phantom debt 
provides the same kind of incentive as actual debt to initiate while a 
manager's interest still has significant value. Yet phantom debt not only 
would eliminate the need for managers to actually purchase debt, but it also 
111. Barry Adler appears to have evasion of this sort in mind in his consideration of other 
corporations' failure to require managers to hold debt. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk 
Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 449-51 (1992) ; see also Jensen & Meckling. supra note 105. 
at 352-53 (noting that firms seldom require managers to hold debt). More generally, the debt incentive 
approach requires ongoing oversight of managers' compliance to assure timely initiation for the subset 
of firms that actually encounter financial distress . I return to this point in summarizing the three 
approaches we are considering. See infra subpart IV(D). 
112. If the debt incentive were tied to a manager's salary, for instance, shareholders could give 
the manager a low fixed salary and supplement it with other benefits such as stock options exercisable 
in the future. Lawmakers would thus be forced to address shareholders' contentions that the benefits 
should not be treated as current salary, or should at the least be deeply discounted . 
113 . As with an actual debt requirement, the phantom debt should have junior status, so that a 
decline in its value would give managers an incentive to take action. I have adapted the term "phantom 
debt" from the "phantom stock" arrangements that nonfinancial firms sometimes use to compensate key 
executives. Cf. supra note 104 (discussing a similar parallel between my use of "debt incentive" and . 
executives' stock incentives). 
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would require significantly less oversight, because there would be no need 
for managers to hold actual debt on an ongoing basis . 
An obvious concern with phantom debt is that if managers could only 
cash it in after an insolvency proceeding , the phantom debt might give 
them too great an incentive to initiate. To assure herself the phantom debt 
payoff, a manager might initiate even if the firm were not genuinely in 
financial distress . 114 Both managers' shareholding interest in the firm and 
their human capital stake would significantly counteract this problem. But 
a manager who thought she was about to be ousted (and thus had a 
diminished human capital interest) might still have an incentive to initiate 
prematurely. 
One can imagine a variety of ways to minimize this concern. Perhaps 
the best would be to give managers a partial payment on their phantom 
debt in the event they were terminated under circumstances other than 
insolvency. Paying managers a specified percentage, say fifty percent, of 
the phantom debt's face value at termination would reduce premature 
initiation. 
The effect of phantom debt would be very much like that of the third 
and final approach to managerial initiation, an initiation "bonus." I turn 
to the bonus approach in the next section and describe it at some length, 
then summarize and compare the three approaches. 
C. Initiation Bonuses 
The principle underlying the bonus approach is simple: rather than 
penalize managers who fail to initiate insolvency proceedings in a timely 
fashion as a true penalty does, lawmakers could use a bonus to "bribe" 
managers to serve as initiators. The promise of a bonus, such as a portion 
of the firm's going concern value, could encourage managers to initiate 
timely insolvency proceedings. 
I begin the analysis of bonuses by developing a simple illustration to 
show how a bonus approach could encourage managers to participate in 
initiation. Under the simplifying assumptions I use in the illustration, the 
bonus induces managers to take the initiation decision into their own hands 
and to make the appropriate choice. In the sections that follow, I relax the 
114. Golden parachutes raise very similar concerns in other contexts . Golden parachutes often 
are designed to counteract managers' inclinations to resist a takeover, but many observers fear that they 
tend to be so generous as to give managers too great an incentive to agree to a takeover. See John C. 
Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role 
in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM . L. REV. 1145 , 1237 (1984) . For evidence that these concerns 
are overstated and that golden parachutes provide significant benefits for the shareholders of a target, 
see Judith C. Machlin et al., The Effects of Golden Parachutes on Takeover Activity, 36 J .L. & ECON. 
861 (1993). 
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assumptions to address potential objections and to provide a more complete 
account of both the promise and the limitations of the bonus approach. 
I. A Simple Illustration of the Bonus Approach.-For the purposes of 
our initial illustration, assume that Manager is the sole stockholder of 
Firm, a bank or insurance company. We will further assume that Firm has 
encountered financial distress and that the presence or absence of a bonus 
did not affect Manager's decisionmaking prior to Firm's difficulties . That 
is , we will focus solely on the bonus's effect once Firm has encountered 
financial distress. 11 5 
If the financial distress is serious, the optimal response is to initiate an 
insolvency proceeding promptly rather than delaying. The dilemma under 
existing law is that regulators are likely to initiate too late, allowing Firm's 
overall value to decline. 
We can restate the problem in simple algebraic terms. If regulators 
initiate an insolvency proceeding immediately, the total social value of 
Firm can be defined as the sum of the value of its assets ( V) and the 
private benefits available to Manager (b), such as her salary and whatever 
benefits she receives (for example, status or a company car) as the manager 
of Firm. 11 6 If regulators permit Firm to continue, rather than initiating 
an insolvency proceeding, Firm's value will be the sum of Vc and be Our 
assumption that permitting Firm to continue will sacrifice value means that 
The cost of tardy initiation is thus the difference between ( V + b) and ( Vc 
+ bJ. 
Under existing law, Manager's interests directly conflict with the goal 
of maximizing the overall value of Firm. The value of Manager's stock 
interest (S) (which gives Manager a contingent interest in the value of 
Firm's assets (V)) and her private benefits (b) are higher if Firm continues 
because initiation will destroy whatever value remains in Firm's equity and 
will cost Manager her job. 117 Because of this conflict, Manager is far 
more likely to thwart than encourage initiation. 
The intuition underlying the bonus approach is that a properly struc-
tured bonus might counteract Manager's aversion to initiation and harness 
her superior information as to the extent of Firm's financial distress. To 
115. I discuss the ex ante effects of a bonus infra section IV(C)(3). 
116 . The value of Manager ' s equity or other investment interest in Firm is not included in 0 since, 
as noted below, this is an interest in the value of Firm's assets (V), rather than a private benefit. 
117 . That is , Sc + be > S; + be Manager' s private benefits from continuing obviously will be 
discounted to reflect the likelihood that an insolvency proceeding evenrually will be commenced, but 
they retain some value in the interim. 
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prove effective, the bonus must assure Manager that she will be at least as 
well off under a prompt initiation as she would be if Firm were allowed to 
continue. This suggests that an appropriate bonus (B) should be structured 
as follows : 
B > ( sc + b J - ( s, + bY 18 
Because initiation is likely to eliminate the value of Firm's stock (S1 = $0) 
and terminate Manager's job and its related benefits (b, = $0) under exist-
ing law, the required bonus may simplify to (Sc + be) as a practical 
matter. 119 
To put this in less abstract terms, assume that Firm's assets will be 
worth $1 million if regulators initiate an insolvency proceeding immedi-
ately but will be worth only $700,000 if there is a delay. Manager's 
private benefits are worth $100,000 if she retains her job for the time 
being, but they are worth very tittle after initiation. The value of Firm's 
stock is $50,000 if Firm continues 120 and declines to zero after initiation. 
On these facts, Manager would encourage initiation only if she were 
assured a bonus worth more than $150,000. 
As with each of the incentive devices we have considered, the obvious 
question is how to structure the bonus in practice, given that the actual 
values of, among other things, Manager's private benefits are quite difficult 
to determine prospectively. 121 The best approach, in my view, would be 
to set the bonus as a percentage of the firm's going concern value. 122 
118 . B ideally should be only slightly greater than (Sc + bJ - (S; + b;); if it is significantly more, 
the bonus will give Manager too great an incentive to initiate. 
119. This equation is true at least with respect to banks. Managers are marginally more likely to 
be retained, at least temporarily , in an insurance insolvency , which suggests that (b;) has a positive 
value. The changes that I propose in Pan V would reinforce this effect and thus reduce the amount 
of bonus necessary to give managers an incentive to initiate . 
120. The stock has value even if the firm is insolvent due to the possibility that a dramatic change 
in fonunes will reverse the firm ' s financial distress . Delaying initiation keeps this possibility open and 
thus temporarily preserves the implicit option shareholders have on the assets of the fim1. 
121. Alan Schwanz's recent discussion of contracting over bankruptcy procedures assumes that 
the parries can calculate a manager's private benefits ex ante and thus raises closely analogous issues. 
See Alan Schwanz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J .L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 137 & n.21 (1997) 
(suggesting some firms would contract to give managers a ponion of a firm's value in bankruptcy to 
induce the appropriate choice between liquidation and reorganization). 
122 . By going concern value, I mean the difference between the firm ' s piecemeal liquidation value 
and its value as an ongoing enterprise. Cf. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After 
the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 750 n.33 (1988) 
(using a much narrower definition of going concern value) . For a bank, the going concern value 
includes, among other things, roughly one percent of the bank's deposits (which includes the cost to 
another bank of attracting the deposits and the cost to depositors of switching to another bank), together 
with the value of the bank's existing relationships with borrowers and its existing network of branches. 
See Telephone Interview with Leonard K. Nakamura, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of 
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For now, however, the most important point is that bonuses could be used 
to enhance the role of managers in initiation. 
2. Concerns About Managers as Initiators .-Having considered 
bonuses in a somewhat pristine form, we now can begin to relax some of 
the previously used assumptions. 
Let us begin with the managers. In contrast to our assumption that 
insolvency is an exogenous event, observers have long believed that most 
bank and insurance company insolvencies can be traced to managerial 
fraud. 123 To the extent this is true, it raises significant doubts about a 
proposal which, like bonuses, rewards managers for pushing the company 
into an insolvency proceeding . 
Although banks and insurance companies seem particularly susceptible 
to managerial fraud, the increasing competitiveness of financial services 
and insurance markets suggests that banks and insurance companies now 
are much more likely to fail for the same reasons that other firms fail, 
including competition and exogenous shocks, rather than simple managerial 
misbehavior. 124 Moreover, the bonus approach could respond to mana-
gerial fraud by removing managers who have committed fraud and denying 
them the benefits of an initiation bonus. 125 
Another concern is that even honest managers simply do not have an 
adequate grasp on their company's financial status on many occasions and 
thus would not be effective initiators. In other words, managers may not 
have the kind of superior information I have assumed. 126 My own sus-
picion is that this may sometimes be true, at least in small banks and 
insurance companies, but that managers will nevertheless often have the 
best information about their firm. Moreover, to the extent managers are 
inadequately informed, their information deficiencies seem more likely to 
lead to false negatives-that is, a misguided belief that the company is still 
healthy-than false positives. 127 This assertion suggests only that 
Philadelphia (Mar. 8, 1996). Insurance companies are likely to have an analogous going concern 
value. 
One advantage of focusing on going concern value is that bank regulators already calculate this 
value when they resolve a bank insolvency. An obvious alternative would be to base the bonus on the 
firm's total value. 
123. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
125. Regulators' handling of the savings and loan crisis does suggest at least one concern, which 
is that regulators would be excessively quick to characterize managerial behavior as fraud. 
126. This possibility would also raise questions about debt incentives and , to a lesser extent, the 
true penalty approach. 
127. One might also expect false negatives if managers continued to fear the stigma of having been 
associated with a bank or insurance company failure, as they do under the current regime. But the 
proposals in this Article are designed to counteract the insolvency stigma. 
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managerial initiation may not always improve on the existing regime, not 
that it will lead to affirmative harm. 
3. Concerns About Ineffectiveness, and Perverse Incentives .-Relaxing 
our assumption that insolvency stemmed from an exogenous shock raises 
two more concerns about the effect of a bonus. The first is that such a 
bonus might have no effect at all on the initiation decision , and the second 
is that it could have a perverse effect on ex ante incentives. 
The ineffectiveness concern reflects a fear that bonuses would simply 
give managers a way to have their cake and eat it too . In particular, if 
managers receive a bonus regardless of when they initiate an insolvency 
proceeding , the bonus might have little effect on initiation because the man-
agers could delay for as long as possible and still receive the same benefit 
they would get if they had filed more promptly. 128 
While this is in fact an important limitation of bonuses, it is important 
to note that it only holds true if the value of the bonus does not diminish 
as the firm's financial troubles worsen. Thus, if the bonus is based on 
going concern value, and this value does not deteriorate as a company 
encounters financial distress, the concern is a serious one; but if financial 
distress tends to impair going concern value, the bonus approach should 
have a beneficial effect on managers' incentives. 129 
I am not aware of any empirical data on the degree of correlation 
between going concern value and financial distress, but it seems likely that 
going concern value does decrease as a bank or insurance company's finan-
cial difficulties deepen. 130 Moreover, the lowering of regulatory burdens 
in recent years may actually have increased this effect in the banking 
context because banks no longer have nearly as great an inherent (and thus 
128. This is the problem with Oliver Hart's offhanded suggestion that, in the corporate bankruptcy 
context, lawmakers could give managers senior debt to encourage them to accede to bankruptcy in both 
existing U.S . bankruptcy procedures and in his proposed substitute for the Chapter ll reorganization 
process. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 161, 178 (1995). The 
problem with senior debt is that it would retain its value as the firn1's fortunes declined. Managers 
could therefore actively resist bankruptcy with the full assurance they would receive most or all of the 
face value of their debt if the firm did eventually fail. 
129. Recall that the ability of the debt incentive approach to address this concern is one of its chief 
attractions. In particular, because the value of managers' debt security will deteriorate as the firm's 
fortunes worsen, the approach gives managers an incentive to initiate sooner rather than later. 
130. An alternative approach, if one concluded that going concern value is not adequately 
correlated with financial health, might be to tie managers' bonuses to regulators' assessments of a 
firm's current capital status. In the banking context, for instance, lawmakers could provide for a bonus 
if managers sought to initiate an insolvency proceeding while the bank fell within Zone 4, but deny any 
bonus for banks in Zone 5. This approach might force managers to act more promptly and to do so 
at a time when the regulators had not yet fully appreciated the extent of the bank's problems. But the 
approach also has appreciable downsides , such as the incentive it would give managers to focus more 
on when they thought regulators were about to downgrade the bank to Zone 4 than on the bank's actual 
status. 
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inelastic) franchise value as they did when the chartering process was more 
monopolistic in nature. Finally, many of the sources of bank and insurance 
company going concerns , such as the deposit or policyholder base, are 
sensitive to financial distress. 
In contrast to questions about efficacy, another possible criticism of 
a bonus approach is that it will exacerbate managers' perverse decision-
making incentives. Because the promise of a bonus ensures that managers 
and shareholders will not lose their entire investment even if the firm fails , 
they have even more incentive than they might otherwise have to take 
excessive risks . 131 While there is no question that the concern is a real 
one, the consequences to managers when a bank or insurance company fails 
are draconian enough that a bonus seems likely to produce at most a 
marginal increase in risktaking. 132 
4. Managers or Shareholders: Who Should Receive the Bonus?-Thus 
far, I have assumed that the bank or insurance company is wholly owned 
by its manager. Many financial institutions, like other firms, are charac-
terized by a separation of ownership and control. A crucial question for 
these firms is whether the bonus should be given to managers alone or to 
all shareholders. 
Although the most obvious goal of the inducement is to counteract 
managerial agency costs, several factors counsel in favor of basing the 
bonus on shareholdership rather than managerial status. 133 First, limiting 
the bonus to managers would create shareholder-manager conflicts that 
could significantly complicate the approach. Shareholders might routinely 
challenge managerial initiation-for instance, charging that managers were 
focusing more on their own interest in obtaining the bonus than on the best 
interests of the bank or insurance company. The second factor is in a 
sense the opposite concern: although the bonus should give managers an 
incentive to initiate, some still may resist initiation, particularly if their 
131. Barry Adler has criticized risk-sharing theories of corporate bankruptcy in these terms . See 
Adler, supra note 111. at 473-75. Notice that the concern is precisely the opposite of the one that 
arises with the true penalty and debt incentive approaches. In contrast to the concern that bonuses 
would produce excessive risktaking, penalties and penalty-like approaches raise the specter of excessive 
risk aversion. 
132. Moreover, the bonus approach has the same kind of offsetting, beneficial effects as risk-
sharing has in other contexts. See, e.g., Thomas H . Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of 
Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 169-74 
(1989) (explaining how risksharing reduces eve-of-bankruptcy conflicts without many of the costs of 
the Bankruptcy Code's redistributive provisions); cf. Adler, supra note 111, at 488 (suggesting that 
redistributing some of the proceeds of an auction would be a better risk sharing device than current 
bankruptcy law) . 
133. In addition to the factors discussed below, a managerial bonus would function very much like 
phantom debt. It is therefore useful to consider a shareholder-based approach for purposes of 
comparison. 
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prospects for obtaining another, similar job are bleak. Targeting share-
holders with the bonus would give shareholders an incentive to pressure 
managers to initiate an insolvency proceeding either directly or through the 
threat of displacing the firm's current board. Finally, that managers 
frequently are significant shareholders and their pay increasingly is 
correlated with firm performance reinforces the conclusion that any bonus 
should be based on shareholdership. 134 
Despite these attractions, it is important to emphasize that shareholder 
bonuses only partially reconcile the interests of managers and shareholders 
if the firm 's stock is widely held . Their principal limitation is that a 
manager's stake includes her private benefits , whereas most other share-
holders are concerned only with the value of the firm's stock. Setting the 
bonus high enough to compensate managers for their potential loss of pri-
vate benefits runs the risk of making nonrnanager shareholders too anxious 
to initiate, while a smaller bonus might not be sufficient to realign fully the 
managers' incentives. 135 This concern obviously is diminished if the 
managers hold a large equity stake in the bank or insurance company. 
5. Bonuses in Companies Structured as a Mutual.-The last issue I 
will consider arises from the mutual structure of many insurance companies 
(and some bank-like intermediaries) . Although insurance companies have 
tended away from rather than toward the mutual structure in recent years, 
mutuals are responsible for nearly half of the life insurance and one-fourth 
of the property insurance in force. 136 That mutuals are owned by their 
134. See generally R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Er:ecutive Pay and Performance: Evidence 
from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 105 (1995) (finding evidence of higher managerial 
rumove r and a greater correlation between pay and performance in deregulated interstate banking 
markets). 
Another advantage of focusing on shareholders is that it eliminates the need to determine which 
managers would be entitled to participate in a manager-based bonus . 
135 . To put this in terms I used previously , shareholder bonuses can be seen as an adjustment to 
the value of shareholder's stock in connection with an ;nsolvency proceeding (S,). If the adjustment 
is increased to account for a manager 's loss of private benefits (b, ), the adjustment will produce a wind-
fall for shareholders whose interests do not include private benefits . A more precise bonus would 
compensateS, and b, separately. 
136. See Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual Versus Stock, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 125 (1985). Hansmann argues, with respect to life insurance, that the murual 
form can be explained as a response to asymmetric information and the lock-in effect of long term 
contracts with a limited exit option. See id. at 129-33. In the property insurance context, he attributes 
the murual form to intra-industry efforts to obtain lower insurance rates . See id. at 149. For a 
somewhat different theory of the muruals , see David Mayers & Clifford W . Smith, Jr., Ownership 
Structure Across Lines of Propeny-Casualty Insurance, 31 J .L. & ECON. 351, 356-57 ( 1988) 
(characterizing muruals as controlling incentive problems between policyholders and stockholde rs, at 
the risk of exacerbating managerial incentive problems). For further analysis and evidence supporting 
their account, see David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Organizational Forms Within the Insurance 
Industry: Theory and Evidence (Feb. 2, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law 
Review). 
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policyholders rather than stockholders raises a question of whether the 
bonus approach makes sense for such companies. 137 
On inspection, it becomes clear that bonuses would be equally effect-
ive for mutuals. But reaching that conclusion requires us to address two 
issues. The first question, given the absence of shareholders, is who 
should receive the bonus. Initially at least, the obvious group on which to 
focus is whoever is entitled to the residual profits of the company and thus 
plays a role somewhat analogous to that of the shareholder-ordinarily, the 
policyholders .138 
Second, what about the managers of the company? In a stock 
company, because the managers usually hold stock, a stock-based incentive 
will influence both shareholders and managers. In a mutual, however, 
managers and policyholders do not have the same conunonality of interest. 
Given that managers would make the initiation decision in a bonus regime, 
one possible approach would be to give managers, rather than 
policyholders, of a mutual the bonus. This approach could create signifi-
cant conflicts of interest between managers and policyholders, however, 
which suggests that policyholders should also receive a bonus. In view of 
this suggestion, the most sensible solution might give the majority of the 
bonus to policyholders but set aside a portion for managers to give them 
an incentive to initiate an insolvency proceeding in a timely fashion. 139 
The possibility of dividing the bonus between policyholders and mana-
gers leads to an obvious question: what portion should managers receive? 
One approach would be to base managers' share on the average percentage 
of stock that managers hold in stock companies of comparable size. Thus, 
if the principal managers of mid-sized property and casualty companies 
own an average of three percent of the company's stock, lawmakers could 
give the managers of a similarly situated mutual three percent of the going-
concern bonus in connection with an insolvency proceeding. 
In the next Part I will argue that adding a reorganization option in the 
insurance context could diminish the need for an explicit bonus and thus 
137. Because the concerns discussed below stem from the nexus berween the bonus approach I 
have advocated and shareholdership, they would not arise in connection with the true penalty or debt 
incentive approaches. 
138. An article by John Hetherington is perhaps the most widely cited discussion of the nature of 
policyholders' role. See John A.C. Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance 
Companies?, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 1068 (contending that policyholders have only limited control of a 
mutual). Despite the practical limits of policyholders' control, policyholders still are the obvious choice 
to receive any bonus. See generally Theodore Allegaert, Comment, Derivative Actions by 
Policyholders on Behalf of Mutual Insurance Companies, 63 U. CHI. L. REV . 1063 (1996) (arguing 
for policyholder standing to pursue derivative claims in the mutual context) . 
139. Jackson briefly alludes to the possibility of a similar approach in the corporate bankruptcy 
context. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 207 n.44 (1986) 
(suggesting that shareholders and managers should share in a court-formulated bounty to encourage the 
timely initiation of bankruptcy proceedings). 
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might avoid the complexities we have just considered . The present analysis 
suggests that , even if lawmakers did not adopt a reorganization option, a 
bonus-based approach to managerial initiation could prove effective for 
mutuals as well as stock companies . 
D. Summary and Conclusions: How Can or Should the Incentive Device 
Be Implemented ? 
My analysis of true penalties, debt incentives, and bonuses is intended 
to emphasize the s imple point that , although managers currently have little 
reason to contribute to the initiation decision, a variety of strategies could 
be used to realign managers' incentives. Giving managers the authority to 
initiate, and adopting one of the approaches we have considered , could 
dramatically improve the initiation process. 
Of the approaches we have considered , I am leas t optimistic about 
employing a true penalty approach. The difficulty of determining in retro-
spect when managers "should" have initiated insolvency would make the 
approach difficult to apply. Further, penalties of this sort might induce 
managers to avoid failure at all costs, a stance at odds with the increasingly 
competitive markets within which banks and insurance companies operate. 
Both the debt incentive and bonus approaches are more promising in 
this respect. Through changes in the value of the managers' debt , debt 
incentives send a much clearer signal to managers as to when to initiate 
insolvency proceedings . Further, the bonus approach affirmatively rewards 
managers for initiating insolvency proceedings in timely fashion . 
To be sure, both phantom debt and shareholder bonuses, like manage-
rial initiation generally, raise questions similar to those prompted by the 
creditor initiation proposals we considered in Part III. But the concerns 
seem much less problematic in this context. While managers are less likely 
than regulators to take systemic risk into account, for instance, not only 
have changes such as depositor priority made contagion effects less likely 
than in the past, but also managerial initiation can easily accommodate 
adjustments designed to enable regulators to respond to the threat of 
systemic risk. 140 
Phantom debt is in some respects the most attractive approach. For 
instance, it is less likely than a true penalty or other debt incentive 
approach to induce excessive risk aversion. Phantom debt also shares with 
bonuses an additional advantage over the use of actual debt. Neither would 
require nearly as much oversight as an actual debt requirement , which 
140. Rather than initiating publicly, for instance , lawmakers could require manage rs first to notify 
regulators privately , so that regulators could delay the initiation if its announcement seemed likely to 
have a contag ion effect. Similar protections could be added to creditor initia tio n , but the prospect of 
regula tory interference seems likely to be mo re disruptive in that context. 
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would impose ongoing implementation costs even in firms that are 
financially sound. 
In addition to providing several of the same benefits as a shareholder 
bonus , phantom debt also avoids several of the limitations peculiar to 
bonuses . Phantom debt would not create an incentive to take excessive risk 
while the firm is healthy, for instance, and the approach would not need 
to be adjusted for firms that are structured as mutuals. 
Yet shareholder bonuses have an offsetting attraction : because they 
would be given not only to managers, but also to shareholders, shareholder 
bonuses reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders . This 
commonality of interest could reduce shareholders' incentive to challenge 
managers' decision to initiate an insolvency proceeding and give share-
holders a reason to prod managers to initiate should the managers of a 
troubled firm drag their feet. 
Given that the choice between phantom debt and shareholder bonuses 
could vary from firm to firm, the best means of implementing managerial 
incentives might be to let the firms themselves decide whether to adopt one 
of the approaches . 141 This is particularly true given the uncertainty 
regarding how much phantom debt to give managers and how large a 
shareholder bonus to promise . 
The practical obstacles to this strategy are quite straightforward. 
Because managers are precluded from initiating bank and insurance 
insolvencies, lawmakers would need to authorize managerial initiation . 
Permitting managers to remain in place after initiation142 would further 
enhance their interest in the initiation decision, as we shall see in the next 
Part. 
Perhaps the most important objection to the private contracting strat-
egy I have just described is that managers would implement plans 
promising excessive benefits on initiation, which would give them too great 
an incentive to m1t1ate. The obvious analogy here is to other firms' 
adoption of golden parachutes that are triggered by a takeover of the firm. 
Although golden parachutes have the beneficial effect of counteracting 
managers' incentives to resist a takeover that may cost them their jobs, 
many observers fear they are so generous that they make managers too 
willing to agree to a takeover bid. 
Given that managers routinely lose their jobs after a takeover, the 
argument that golden parachutes will make them too anxious for a takeover 
seems debatable at best. 143 Moreover, market forces will penalize a firm 
141. This of course is a major theme of much of the recent corporate bankruptcy literature. 
142 . With banks, for instance, this would require amendment of 12 U.S .C. § 1831o(f)(2)(F)(ii) 
( 1994). 
143. See supra note 114. 
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that adopts an inefficient golden parachute once it is in place. In 
consequence, the most significant concern with golden parachutes, and by 
analogy phantom debt and shareholder bonuses, is that firms will be oppor-
tunistic and will implement them immediately before the triggering event. 
Although opportunistic changes are a concern in many contexts, the 
risk is easily remedied in this context. Bankruptcy law addresses related 
concerns by reversing preferential transfers that a debtor makes on the eve 
of bankruptcy. 144 By invalidating phantom debt or bonus arrangements 
adopted shortly before insolvency, lawmakers could eliminate the risk of 
opportunism. 145 
Another possible concern is that financial intermediaries might have 
too little incentive to employ either of the two devices . To the extent that 
the deposit insurance framework in banking and insurance guaranty funds 
enables firms to externalize risk, firms may be disinclined to encourage 
initiation. The move to risk-based capital seems likely to reduce, but not 
eliminate, the risk subsidy. 
Despite its limitations, private contracting seems more promising than 
adopting phantom debt or shareholder bonuses legislatively. But a legisla-
tive approach also would improve on the existing framework. Unlike 
phantom debt, shareholder bonuses could easily be structured as a single, 
uniform rule for all firms. As a result, shareholder bonuses seem partic-
ularly amenable to legislative implementation. 
Even if lawmakers eschewed phantom debt and bonuses altogether, 
permitting managers to initiate insolvency proceedings still would improve 
on the current, regulator-controlled framework . This will become even 
clearer in the next Part of my analysis, in which I will show that several 
relatively simple adjustments to the disposition options in bank and insur-
ance company insolvencies could act as an implicit bonus to managers, thus 
encouraging initiation in the absence of the kinds of incentive devices I 
have considered. 
E. Creditors' Role in Initiation: A Reprise 
As an alternative to the creditor initiation reforms we considered in 
Part III, I have proposed in this Part that managers be given an incentive 
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A)-(B) (1994) (invalidating transfers occurring on or within 90 
days of bankruptcy, with a reach back period of one year for insiders). 
145. Both Bob Rasmussen and I have proposed similar strategies in connection with proposed 
reforms of corporate bankruptcy law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate 
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 471,544 (1994) (proposing that states be permitted 
to regulate corporate bankruptcy, under a scheme that would disallow eve-of-bankruptcy changes to a 
firm's state of incorporation); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate 
Bankruptcy , 71 TEXAS L. REV. 51, 100-21 (1992) (proposing to allow firms to prospectively choose 
the type of insolvency proceedings to which they will be subject, but restricting modifications on the 
eve of bankruptcy). 
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to m1t1ate an insolvency proceeding. But managerial initiation does not 
necessarily mean prohibiting creditors from participating. Should a firm's 
existing creditors also have the authority to initiate, even if lawmakers 
adopt managerial initiation rather than one of the existing creditor initiation 
proposals? 
The analogy to other corporations suggests that they should. Although 
managers file nearly every corporate bankruptcy petition, even though 
creditors also have this right , 146 it is widely believed that managers ' filing 
decisions are routinely prompted by creditor monitoring or collection 
effects . 147 In view of creditors' role in other corporate contexts, it would 
seem sensible to give creditors similar initiation authority in the banking 
and insurance context. 
The real question is not whether creditors as well as managers should 
be given the right to initiate, but whether the initiation right would prove 
effective. To appreciate the obstacles to creditor initiation, we need only 
consider the parameters of creditor initiation in the Bankruptcy Code. 
Under the Code, creditors must show that the debtor is not "paying its 
debts as they come due" to force a debtor into bankruptcy. 148 While it 
might seem appropriate at first glance to adopt a similar standard for 
financial intermediary insolvencies, a moment's reflection reveals that such 
a standard would prove ineffectual. Unlike other corporations, banks and 
insurance companies do not begin failing to pay creditors when they 
encounter financial distress because they have an ongoing source of cash 
flow from, and no ongoing payment obligation to, depositors and 
policyholders. Thus, if the standard were failure to pay debts , creditors 
would play little role in initiation. 
What , then, might the standard be? The obvious alternative would be 
to adopt a balance sheet standard authorizing creditors to initiate an 
insolvency proceeding if the firm's liabilities exceed its assets . This in fact 
was an implicit requirement for creditor initiation under the old Bankruptcy 
Act. 149 The chief shortcoming of this standard, and the reason that the 
146. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes creditors of a firm to file an involuntary petition if three 
creditors (when the debtor has 12 or more creditors) with a total of at least $10,000 in unsecured claims 
JOin the petition. See II U.S.C. § 303(b) (1994) . If the debtor challenges the petition , the creditors 
are required to show that the debtor is "generally not paying [its] debts as [they] become due, " or a 
trustee or receiver was appointed in the 120 days prior to the petition . !d. § 303( h) . 
147. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird , The Initiation Issue in Bankruptcy , 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
223 (1991); Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 
519, 535-36 (1992) (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code's allowance of voluntary bankruptcy 
encourages debtors to file when the debtor's assets contain value for unsecured creditors). 
148. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h). 
149. Underthe old Bankruptcy Act, creditors were required to show that the debtor had committed 
one or more of six ''acts of bankruptcy," such as making a fraudulent or preferential transfer or failing 
to vacate a judicial lien while insolvent. See Bankruptcy Act, 11 U .S.C. § 531 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
Each of the acts of bankruptcy either explicitly or implicitly required a showing of insolvency, which 
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drafters abandoned it with respect to other corporations, was the difficulty 
of proving that the debtor was in fact insolvent when creditors filed a 
bankruptcy petition. 150 The problem could be particularly acute for 
banks and insurance companies, given the notorious opacity of their 
financial status. 151 
Obstacles of this sort raise the question of whether creditors' access 
to information could realistically be improved to enable them to monitor 
more effectively . The most obvious strategy under the existing regime 
might be to require regulators to release the information they obtain 
through the examination process . 152 If creditors had access to even a 
portion of the nonpublic information regulators obtain through 
examinations, they could play a much more active role as monitors 
generally and in contributing to the initiation decision in particular. 
However, public release of examination information also would have 
appreciable downsides. Most importantly, it would dramatically undermine 
banks' and insurance companies' willingness to be forthcoming with 
examiners. As a result, examinations might produce less information about 
the status of the company. Moreover, if creditors were given the right to 
initiate insolvency proceedings , they might themselves insist on greater 
access to information, thus at least partially obviating the need for 
regulators' work product. In view of this, the better approach is not to 
require regulators to publicize the results of their examinations. 
To summarize, the manager initiation regime I have described should 
also give creditors the authority to initiate an insolvency proceeding if they 
can show that a bank's liabilities exceed its assets. Although creditor 
initiation has obvious limitations, it would provide an additional source of 
prompting for managers to initiate an insolvency proceeding if the firm 
encounters intractable financial distress. 
V. The Disposition Decision in Bank and Insurance Insolvency 
Proceedings 
At the other end of the insolvency process from initiation, but closely 
tied to it, is the disposition issue of what to do with a troubled bank or 
was defined in balance sheet terms under§ 1 (19). See Bankruptcy Act § 1 (19) (codified at 11 U .S.C. 
§ 1(19) (1976) (repealed 1978)); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 45, at 808-13 ("As a practical matter 
.. . proof of an act of bankruptcy often required proof of the debtor's insolvency."). 
150. See Block-Lieb, supra note 45, at 811-13 (identifying several problems of proof associated 
with establishing insolvency, including the internal nature of the condition and the vagueness of the 
term "insolvency") . 
151. For a classic analysis of this issue , see Douglas W. Diamond , Financial Intermediation and 
Delegated Monitoring, 1984 REV. ECON. STUD. 393. 
152. For an excellent recent investigation of the information value of the examination process in 
banking, see Berger & Davies, supra note 59. Berger and Davies studied the effects of bank 
examinations on bank stock prices and found, among other things , evidence that examinations that lead 
to downgrades reveal a significant amount of private information. See id. at 28. 
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insurance company that has been put into an insolvency proceeding. It 
would be possible, of course , to resolve financial distress without resort to 
an insolvency proceeding . In the corporate bankruptcy context, for 
instance, commentators have argued for proposals under which financial 
distress would trigger automatic capital structure adjustments. 153 I 
touched on these proposals in Part III and will not revisit them here, but 
it is important to keep in mind that an insolvency proceeding is not the 
only possible means of dealing with troubled companies. 
Roughly speaking, insolvency proceedings lead to one (or a 
combination) of three possible dispositions of a troubled company: (1) 
piecemeal liquidation, (2) a third-party sale, or (3) a traditional 
reorganization. I begin this Part by describing each of these disposition 
options and some of the distinctions among them. I then characterize bank 
and insurance regulators ' current practices in terms of the three 
alternatives. The most striking observation that emerges from the charac-
terization is that neither bank nor insurance insolvency includes a tradi-
tional reorganization option. The question this raises, which we will 
consider for much of the Part, is whether either should-that is, whether 
reorganization would enhance the overall efficiency of the bank or insur-
ance insolvency process. 
A. The Disposition Options: A Brief Overview 
The simplest response to financial distress is to effect a piecemeal 
liquidation. In a piecemeal liquidation, the trustee or receiver closes the 
firm's doors, sells its assets piece-by-piece, then distributes any net 
proceeds to the firm's creditors. 154 The principal attraction of piecemeal 
liquidation is that it avoids the complexities of the other disposition 
options, an attribute that is particularly desirable if a firm's financial 
distress reflects a lack of viability as an ongoing enterprise. 
At the far end of the spectrum from piecemeal liquidation is 
reorganization. The traditional reorganization process entails an extended 
bargaining process among the debtor and its various classes of creditors, 
culminating in the confirmation of a reorganization plan that scales down 
the corporation's debts in order to eliminate its financial distress .155 At 
least with publicly-held corporations, reorganization usually transfers 
shareholding control to the firm's creditors, although shareholders often 
153 . See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
154. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code , II U .S.C . §§ 701-707 (1994), contemplates piecemeal 
liquidation. Receivership status in banking law and liquidation in insurance law both contemplate piece-
meal liquidation as a principal option . 
155. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel , Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM . BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 94 (1995) (arguing that, because of the business 
nature of reorganization , markets and private actors are better suited for control of reorganization than 
are courts) . 
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retain a portion of the stock . 156 As compared to piecemeal liquidation, 
reorganization is justified as necessary to preserve the going concern value 
of a troubled enterprise. 157 
Third-party sales ideally can offer the best of both worlds. Because 
a third-party sale does not require an extensive bargaining process, it may 
be far less costly than a traditional reorganization. 158 Yet third-party 
sales, unlike piecemeal liquidation, preserve a company's going concern 
value because the buyer acquires most or all of the troubled firm . In view 
of these advantages , some conunentators have suggested that it might make 
sense to eliminate corporate reorganization altogether and simply auction 
off a firm once it files for bankruptcy. 159 
It would be a mistake to view third-party sales as a panacea, however. 
Third-party sales are unlikely to be effective for small firms , and they may 
be undermined in other contexts by factors such as the possibility that the 
most likely buyers of a firm, its competitors, may be weakened by the 
same economic forces that contributed to the insolvent firm's decline. 160 
Moreover, the prospect of a third-party sale can give managers an incentive 
to forestall the insolvency proceeding by, among other things, engaging in 
a potentially inefficient sale of the firm's assets. 161 
Given this array of disposition options and the appreciable limitations 
and attractions of each, the questions we will want to keep in mind as we 
turn back to banks and insurance companies are: Which options does the 
existing framework entail, and are the current choices sound? 
B. Disposition Under Current Bank and Insurance Company Law 
Although they have a variety of other alternatives at their 
disposal, 162 bank regulators ordinarily rely on one of three options: (1) 
156. Reorganization effects a "hypothetical sale" of a fim1's assets to existing creditors because 
control usually shifts from the firm ' s former shareholders to its creditors. See id. at 94 (citing Robert 
C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238 , 1250-54 (1981)). 
157. Lawmakers repeatedly sounded this theme in defending the reorganization process that was 
enacted as Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No. 95-595 , at 220 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6179 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets 
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those 
same assets sold for scrap."). 
158. This is the intuition behind the calls for mandatory auctions in the corporate bankruptcy 
context. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993) 
(analyzing the promise and limitations of auctions); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, The Uneasy Case] (arguing that 
most owners would prefer to sell the firm outright to the highest bidder). 
159. See, e.g., Baird , The Uneasy Case, supra note 158, at 128 ("[Due to costs and participant 
manipulation] the entire law of corporate reorganizations is hard to justify under any set of facts and 
virtually impossible when the debtor is a publicly held corporation. " ). 
160. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 57, at 477-79 (describing concerns about the auction process). 
161. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 1197 (explaining that the threat of involuntary 
liquidation encourages voluntary piecemeal liquidation). 
162. See supra Part II. 
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straight liquidation, (2) insured-deposit transfers, and (3) purchase and 
assumption transactions. 163 In a straight liquidation , regulators simply 
liquidate the assets of a bank and pay off the depositors of the bank to the 
extent they are covered by the deposit insurance. Straight liquidation thus 
corresponds to the category I have referred to as piecemeal liquidation. 
The second option , insured-deposit transfers, can be seen as something 
of a hybrid between a piecemeal liquidation and a third-party sale because 
the bank's liabilities are transferred to a third party, but regulators simply 
liquidate its assets piecemeal. 164 Finally, in a purchase and assumption 
transaction, regulators sell some or all of the bank's assets to another bank, 
which also assumes some or all of the bank's liabilities , thus effecting what 
amounts to a third-party sale. 165 
During the bank and thrift crises of the 1980s , many observers were 
critical of regulators' decision as to which of the existing options to employ 
in a given case. The FDIC developed a clear preference for purchase and 
assumption transactions that ensured full payment not only of insured 
depositors but also of uninsured ones, 166 even though other approaches, 
such as an insured-deposit transfer, might have proved far less costly to the 
deposit insurance system. 167 Commentators also criticized the procedures 
that regulators used in effecting purchase and assumption transactions .168 
As noted above, this Part will focus on what bank regulators fail to 
do, rather than what they do-that is, I will focus on how the FDIC's 
standard options all involve what I have referred to as piecemeal liquidation 
or third-party sales to the exclusion of traditional reorganization. It is 
worth noting, however, that some of the criticism of the options that the 
FDIC does employ may have been overstated and that Congress's recent 
legislative efforts could significantly alter regulators' choice among 
disposition options. 169 
First, with respect to the efficacy of the FDIC's purchase and assump-
tion auction procedures, Professors Macey and Miller's criticism draws on 
the auction theory insight that restricting the number of bidders below the 
163. See, e. g., MACEY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 644-47. 
164. See id. at 645 . 
165 . See id. at 646-47 . Because the assets of the failed bank are ordinarily less than its liabilities, 
the sale entails a payment by regulators to the buyer in an amount that reflects the degree of insolvency 
less the bank 's going concern value . !d. 
166. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 6, at 1183 (stating that the FDIC's "observed 
behavior" illustrates its preference for purchase and assumption transactions). 
167. See id. at 1184-87 (contending that declining to protect fully uninsured depositors would both 
decrease costs and give uninsured depositors an incentive to monitor the banks) . 
168. See id. at 1187-91. Macey and Miller argued, for instance, that the FDIC artificially limited 
the number of bidders for a troubled bank's assets, thus diminishing the price it received in the 
purchase and assumption auctions it conducted . 
169. See supra section III ( B)(l) (discussing FDICIA) . 
770 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:723 
natural equilibrium number will diminish the amount of the winning 
bid. 170 Although regulators did conduct secret auctions with a group of 
handpicked bidders, the process may nevertheless have included most or 
all of the likely bidders. The low number of bidders probably sterruned 
less from artificial exclusion than from the regulatory constraints on 
geographical expansion by banks, which reduced the number of possible 
bidders. 171 The continued erosion of these barriers could significantly 
increase the number of potential bidders in future bank insolvencies .172 
On balance, the existing process seems superior to Macey and Miller's 
proposal for public auctions, given that public auctions would create a risk 
of costly depositor runs during the time it takes to structure and hold the 
auction. 
As for regulators' choice between purchase and assumption trans-
actions and other disposition options, the recent depositor preference statute 
will constrain regulators' flexibility in significant respects. 173 Because 
depositors now have priority, and regulators must employ the "least costly" 
disposition option, regulators cannot effect a purchase and assumption 
170. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 6, at 1189 (citing Kenneth R. French & 
Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competirion, 57 1. Bus. 417, 423-
24 (1984)). For an analysis of some of the limitations of French and McCormick' s analysis-most 
notably , their widely cited conclusion that the sales price in an auction will equal the asset ' s value 
minus the total costs of all the bidders-see Victor P. Goldberg , The Gold Ring Problem (Apr. 25 , 
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review). For our purposes , it is interesting 
to note that one of Goldberg's principal concerns may figure less prominently in the banking context 
than elsewhere. Goldberg notes that individual sellers may face a collective action problem which 
undermines their individual incentives to minimize bidders' costs. Because the FDIC conducts all sales 
of troubled banks, it is not an isolated seller, and collective action problems of this son are unlikely 
to figure nearly so prominently as might otherwise be the case. 
171. Moreover, bank regulators' ongoing relationship with the banks they regulate makes them 
particularly well situated to identify the most likely acquiring banks. 
Two aspects of the FDIC's purchase, and assumption procedures further enhance the process by 
reducing bidders' costs. First, the FDIC provides detailed information to bidders to obviate their need 
to generate it themselves. In addition, the FDIC has frequently reduced bidders' concern that the infor-
mation will imply an overly optimistic value by agreeing to take back loans that prove undesirable after 
the purchase and assumption. See French & McCormick, supra note 170, at 430 (stating that reducing 
bidders' costs tends to increase the number of bidders). For a criticism of the FDIC's practice of 
buying back problem loans at full face value, see Eric S. Rosengren & Katerina Simons, Failed Bank 
Resolution and the Collateral Crunch: The Advantages of Adopting Transferable Puts, 22 1. AM. REAL 
EST. & URB . ECON. Ass'N 135, 135-36 (1994) (describing how the current FDIC practice gives 
incentives to foreclose excessively on loans found on the books of failed banks). 
172. Most recently, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Efficiency Act of 1994 has largely 
eliminated the McFadden Act's, 12 U .S.C. § 36(c) (1994), prohibition on interstate banking. See 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub . L. No. 103-328 , 108 Stat. 
2338. For a description of the effects of Riegle-Neal , see Berger et al. , supra note 102, at 62. 
173. See 12 U .S.C. § 1821 (d)(11) (1994). For a discussion (and pointed criticism) of some of the 
potential effects of depositor preference, see Bert Ely, Surprise' Congress Has Just Enacted What 
Amounts to a Core Banking System, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 1993, at 24. 
1998] Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation 771 
transaction if another option would lead to full recovery for insured 
depositors at no cost to the FDIC. 174 Given depositors' newfound 
priority, rhe liquidation-oriented options will often have precisely this effect 
even when a purchase and assumption transaction would not. 175 As a 
result , the current framework should curtail significantly regulators' ability 
to favor purchase and assumption transactions over liquidation and insured 
deposit transfers. 176 
From banks, let us now turn briefly to insurance insolvencies. Like 
bank regulators, insurance regulators frequently resolve financial distress 
by selling some or all of the insurance company's assets to a third 
party. 177 The penchant for third-party sales stems both from regulators' 
strong concern to preserve the company's existing policies and from the 
administrative convenience of simply transferring everything to a third 
party. 178 
The most obvious difference in insurance company insolvency 
proceedings, as compared to bank proceedings, is that regulators do some-
times resolve insurance company insolvencies through something like a 
traditional reorganization. 179 The reorganization process differs in 
174. An ea rlier ve rsion of the "least costly" restriction on disposition pre-dates FIRREA and 
FDICIA. the two principal sources of the new changes , but FDICIA has significantly enhanced its bite. 
Whereas the restriction originally required only that a proposed disposition be less costly than 
liquidation , the provision now requires that the disposition be the least costly possible approach. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A); Swire , supra note 3, at 538 n.251. The new federal depositor preference 
provision should further increase its significance, as I discuss in detail below . 
175. Consider a simple illustration . Assume that a bank has assets of $1000; its $1200 in 
liabilities consist of $400 of secured claims, $600 of deposits, and $200 in unsecured claims. Suppose 
that regulators can either liquidate the bank or effect a purchase and assumption transaction, pursuant 
to which another bank is willing to acquire the bank's assets and assume all of its secured claims and 
depo si ts if regulators pay the acquirer $110. (Notice that this implies a $90 going concern value since 
the face amount of the bank ' s liabilities exceed its assets by $200 ($1200- $1000), but regulators are 
only required to make a $110 payment.) Absent the depositor preference statute, regulators could opt 
for the purchase and assumption, because the purchase and assumption would only cost regulators $110, 
whereas a liquidation would require them to pay the $150 difference between depositors' pro rata share 
of the $600 left for unsecured creditors (here, the depositors and the unsecured claims) after the 
secured claims were paid (($600/$800)x($600) = $450), and the $600 total that depositors are owed . 
By contrast, under depositor preference , depositors would be paid in full in a liquidation, as compared 
to the $110 cost of the purchase and assumption. Regulators would therefore have no choice but to 
liquidate the troubled bank. 
176. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Legal and Political Implications of Depositor Preference (Summer 
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review). 
177. This is especially true with life insurers, due at least in part to the premium placed on keeping 
life insurance in place. Property and casualty insurer insolvencies are more likely to result in piecemeal 
liquidation. 
178. See, e.g., Christopher M . Maisel & Robert H . Nunnally, Managing a Large Insurer 
Insolvency- The Erecutive Life of California Etperience, in ABA, LIFE INSURANCE INSOLVENCY, supra 
note 35, § 2-1. 
179. Recall from subpart II(B) that this is particularly true with large insurance companies. 
772 Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:723 
important respects from that of other companies under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, however, because regulators rather than managers and 
creditors control the proceedings . 180 
C. Is There a Place for Traditional Reorganization? 
My analysis thus far has highlighted that bank regulators almost never 
use traditional reorganization as a disposition option, and insurance regu-
lators do so relatively infrequently and in a somewhat limited way. Why 
is this? The most obvious reasons are that bank and insurance regulation 
simply has developed in a different direction as a historical matter, or that 
regulators have eschewed reorganization because it would prove 
ineffective. 181 
Although both of these elements contain a certain amount of truth, the 
increasing tendency to view banks and insurance companies in the same 
fashion as other corporations and to focus on the financial effects of capital 
structure choices suggests the need to at least consider the potential efficacy 
of traditional reorganization as an alternative to liquidation and third-party 
sales. Moreover, the availability or unavailability of a reorganization 
option has important implications for our final assessment of the managerial 
(and creditor) initiation regime I described in the last Part. 
I . Reorganization for Banks (and the Practical Obstacles). -On first 
inspection, reorganization does not even appear to be a plausible option for 
banks due to two significant obstacles. First, much more than a liquidation 
or third-party sale, the reorganization process by its very nature takes 
time. 182 The problem with this factor in the banking context is that even 
180. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text. It is important not to overstate this contrast 
between banks and insurance companies when it comes to the disposition question. Although bank 
regulators do not ordinarily reorganize insolvent banks in the traditional sense , their invocation of the 
"too big to fail" doctrine (when they make a cash infusion) can have a similar effect when a large bank 
encounters financial difficulty. 
181. Another explanation is that bank and insurance insolvency law has traditionally been based 
on the assumption that the goal of bank and insurance regulation is to prevent failure at all costs. 
Reorganization, by contrast, has tended to assume a willingness to permit failure as a normal incident 
of market processes. As the analysis of this Article suggests, the traditional reluctance to let banks and 
insurance companies fail seems inappropriate in the current era of bank and insurance company 
competition. For an early argument that banks should be allowed to fail, see A. Dale Tussing, The 
Case for Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129, 131 (1967) (contending that "competition in banking, 
inclusive of the threat of failure , [is] consistent with the usual purported objectives of bank regulation, 
namely protection of depositors and maintenance of a viable and efficient payment mechanism"). 
182. It is important not to overemphasize the distinction between reorganization and the other 
alternatives in this respect, however. Liquidations and third-party sales also take time . Currently, bank 
regulators conduct much of the process secretly , before they formally initiate an insolvency proceeding. 
See, e.g. , Clark, Soundness, supra note 6, at 101. This suggests that the more significant distinction 
between reorganization and the alternatives may be that it is more difficult (though not impossible) to 
conduct a reorganization outside of the formal process. 
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insured depositors may withdraw their deposits if there is any appreciable 
delay between the initiation and conclusion of an insolvency proceeding. 
Regulators could minimize withdrawals by freezing deposits during the 
pendency of the proceeding, but this action seems unattractive given many 
depositors' need for ongoing access to their accounts. 
The second obstacle stems from the nature of the deposit insurance 
framework. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, the reorganization process 
often centers on the negotiations between the firm 's managers and a wide 
range of unsecured creditors who, in bankruptcy, are the firm's residual 
owners. ! 83 In the banking context, by contrast, the FDIC often 
dominates the firm' s capital structure because it steps into the shoes of ali 
of the bank's insured depositors in the event that the bank becomes 
insolvent. Because so much of the liabilities are held, in effect, by the 
FDIC (and depositor preference limits the extent to which deposit liabilities 
can be adjusted), it is not immediately clear whether a traditional 
reorganization process would have a meaningful role to play. 184 
Interestingly, neither concern is insurmountable. With respect to the 
first and arguably more difficult issue, bank regulators already have the 
authority to set up a bridge bank for the duration of an insolvency 
proceeding. 185 In theory at least, regulators could give the managers of 
a troubled bank a thirty or forty day period to devise a reorganization plan 
and use a bridge bank to maintain relatively normal operations in the 
interim. This procedure would not eliminate depositor withdrawals, 186 
to be sure, but it might limit depositor flight if the transition were smooth 
enough. 
As for the role of reorganization, managers might propose to scale 
down nondepositor creditors' debts and in some cases to give the FDIC 
something less than the full amount of the deposits as an alternative to 
piecemeal liquidation or a third-party sale. If the cost to the FDIC were 
less than the other disposition options, reorganization could (again, in 
theory) prove attractive. 
183. See, e. g., David A. Skeel , Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA . L. REV. 461, 485 (1992) (arguing that the voting process tends to focus 
attention on the unsecured creditors). 
184. Another important question is whether the game is worth the candle: because many of banks' 
assets are financial in nature, and thus liquid, one could question whether there is likely to be an 
appreciable bank-specific franchise value to reorganize, particularly now that deregulation has reduced 
the monopoly value of a bank charter. In my view, and as suggested in the analysis below, many 
troubled banks would in fact have sufficient going concern value to justify at least considering 
reorganization. 
185. For a description of the FDIC's authority to create a bridge bank, and its applications, see 
Zisman & Waites, supra note 16, § 13 .07, at 60-62. 
186. Recall that depositor withdrawal would be a similar concern if regulators were to effect 
purchase and assumption transactions through a public auction. See supra text accompanying notes 
172-73. 
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The obvious question is whether the advantages of reorganization 
really would be that significant as compared to the existing disposition 
options. With respect to reorganization as I have described it, my own 
inclination is to be skeptical. Reorganization could prove effective in some 
cases. For large banks, for instance, reorganization might make sense as 
an alternative to a third-party sale if there were few or no banks that 
realistically could purchase the troubled bank. 187 For small banks, reor-
ganization could sometimes be attractive because a third-party sale-
assimilating the bank into a larger bank structure-might sacrifice its 
effectiveness in engaging in relational lending. 188 
Yet the downsides of bank reorganization seem daunting. As we have 
discussed, even a bridge bank and a quick reorganization process would 
probably not eliminate the hemorrhaging that would occur during the pen-
dency of the insolvency proceeding. In addition, reorganization could 
easily magnify perverse incentives for regulators to avoid liquidating banks 
at all costs due to the political costs and absence of benefits from 
liquidating. 189 In view of these concerns, traditional reorganization may 
hold only limited promise in the banking context. 
The recent trend toward consolidation in the banking industry does, 
however, suggest that a limited version of reorganization could play a 
valuable role. In the face of heightened competition, troubled banks in 
particular have increasingly looked to merge with another bank as a means 
of enhancing their Jongterm prospects. 190 An obvious limitation of this 
187. If regulators view the bank as "too big to fail,~ however, they would be likely to give it a 
cash infusion outside of an insolvency proceeding, as they did with Continental Illinois, even if reorga-
nization were an option. Recent legislation has restricted but not eliminated regulators' ability to do 
this. 
188. See, e.g., Berger et a!., supra note 102 , at 44 ("[Large] banks may tend to eliminate 
relationship loans ... because such loans demand more intimate knowledge of the small business ... 
gained through contact over time."); Leonard I. Nakamura, Small Borrowers and the Survival of the 
Small Bank: Is Mouse Bank Mighty or Mickey?, Bus. REV. (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), 
Nov .-Dec . 1994, at 3 (arguing that small banks are better at lending to local small businesses than large 
banks) . 
189. The concern is that, because reorganization does not involve an actual market valuation of 
the bank's assets , regulators might often accept excessively optimistic reorganization plans even if the 
bank should be liquidated. If the reorganization initially satisfied the least cost requirements-e.g . , did 
not require any p:.~yment by the FDIC-regulators would have little incentive to consider the likelihood 
that the reorganization would simply lead to more financial distress, and higher costs, in the future. 
190 . For useful case studies of a number of the mergers, see THE BANK MERGER WAVE OF THE 
1990s: NINE CASE STUDIES (Charles Calomiris & Jason Karceski eds . , 1995), and see also Geoffrey 
P . Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 
1131 (1992) (defending the merger trend, and arguing that "[m]arkets, not politicians or bureaucrats, 
should decide the future structure of the American banking industry"); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too 
Good To Be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN . J.L. Bus . & FIN. 1 
(1995) (criticizing the mergers' failure to improve efficiency, produce higher profitability , promote 
competition and service, and reduce systemic risk). 
1998) Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation 775 
approach , however, is the difficulty of effecting a merger if the target bank 
is or is nearly insolvent. 
Bankruptcy law suggests an alternative that could both expand the 
scope of the bank merger market and enhance bank managers' incentives 
to contribute to the initiation decision : the prepackaged bankruptcy plans 
that are explicitly contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code . 191 In a pre-
packaged bankruptcy case, managers of the debtor negotiate the terms of 
the reorganization prior to filing a bankruptcy petition, and then they file 
the plan when or shortly after the debtor enters bankruptcy to minimize the 
time of the bankruptcy case. 192 
Lawmakers could easily add an analogous mechanism for effecting 
third-party sales in a managerial initiation insolvency regime. To see how 
this process might work, consider a simple illustration. If a hypothetical 
bank had assets of $1000 and $1300 in liabilities consisting of $400 of 
secured claims, $800 of deposits, and $100 in unsecured claims, the bank's 
managers might propose a sale pursuant to which the acquiring bank 
acquired its assets and assumed the secured claims and deposits in return 
for a p~yment of $120 by the FDIC. 193 In effect, a prepackaged 
approach would give managers the authority to propose transactions that 
currently are carried out only by regulators. In addition to authorizing 
managerial initiation, the only other change that lawmakers would need to 
make to facilitate these transactions would be to eliminate the strong 
presumption against managers' retaining their jobs after initiation. 194 
The most obvious advantage of permitting managers to propose a pre-
packaged purchase and assumption is, as noted above, that it would drama-
tically enhance their willingness to contribute to the initiation decision . 
Managers of troubled banks will often have explored merger possibilities; 
giving managers more control of the insolvency process by permitting them 
to propose prepackaged sales would encourage managers to explore this 
191. See, e.g., II U.S .C. § 1126(b) (1994) (containing the rules for prebankruptcy solicitation 
of votes). 
192. The most prominent prepackaged bankruptcy case to date has been the Southland Corporation 
bankruptcy. See In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211 (Bankr. S .D . Tex . 1991) . For accounts of 
cases and descriptions of the prepackaged bankruptcy process , see Marc S. Kirschner et al., 
Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The Deleveraging Tool of the '90s in the Wake of OlD and Tax 
Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 643 (1991); Mark E. MacDonald & Daren W. Perkins , 
Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans: The Alternative to "Free Fall" Bankruptcy, I J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
31 (1992). For evidence that prepackaged bankruptcies are quicker and less costly than traditional 
Chapter II reorganizations, see Elizabeth Tashjian et al., ?repacks: An Empirical Analysis of 
Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. EcoN. 135 , 155 (1996) . 
193. Notice that the transaction implies that the troubled bank has $80 in going concern value since 
the acquirer is willing to accept a $120 payment in return for its assumption of liabilities that exceed 
the book value of the bank's assets by $200. 
194. See 12 U.S.C. § 183lo(f)(2)(F)(ii) (1994) (listing the dismissal of directors or senior 
executive officers as one of three ways to improve management). 
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alternative in the event the bank's financial condition made an ordinary 
merger infeasible . A closely related and equally important advantage of 
permitting prepackaged sales is that it would harness managers' private 
information, including the results of their merger discussions with other 
banks, rather than leaving the disposition process entirely to regulators. 
Perhaps the biggest question with a prepackaged purchase and assump-
tion is how much time it would entail. 195 In the corporate bankruptcy 
context, even a successful prepackaged plan can take several months. 196 
But the process sometimes is much quicker, and the FDIC could use the 
same authority it currently employs in effecting purchase and assumptions 
to ensure an immediate disposition. For instance, the managers could 
propose a prepackaged sale to the FDIC privately and obtain preapproval 
of the plan before it became public. Moreover, even if the process were 
entirely public, the probability (assuming that most such transfers were in 
fact ultimately consummated, as seems likely) of transfer to a known 
acquirer should diminish depositors' incentive to withdraw their funds . 
Another concern with permitting managers to propose prepackaged 
purchase and assumptions, as with managerial initiation by itself, is that 
these changes in the role of managers would undermine the exchange of 
information between managers and bank regulators. If managers could 
themselves initiate and even propose a purchase and assumption, the 
reasoning goes, they might be less candid with regulators about a bank's 
status if it encountered trouble. While this could be true to some extent, 
any change in manager-regulator communication seems likely to be small. 
Bank managers already have ample reason to understate any bad news, and 
they still would need to secure regulator approval for any purchase and 
assumption they propose. 
2. Reconceiving the Reorganization of Insurance Companies.-In 
many respects, the obstacles to reorganization of insurance companies 
mirror those we saw with banks. As in the banking context, for instance, 
the time needed for a reorganization could lead to flight by the firm's most 
prominent constituency-for insurance companies, their policyholders. 
Despite the initial similarities, the insurance context is strikingly 
different in that concerns of this sort do not loom nearly as large as with 
banks. Insurance companies do not face anything so dramatic as a bank 
195. Another possible objection is that prepackaged purchase and assumptions, like any form of 
managerial initiation, are suspect because managers do not have an incentive to take systemic risk into 
account. I address the systemic risk objection in the conclusion to this Part. 
196 . See NEW GENERATION RESEARCH, INC. , THE 1996 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 
!56 tbl. (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 6th ed. 1996) (listing the initiation and completion dates of the 
six prepackaged public bankruptcies that were completed in 1995, the longest taking over four months). 
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run, for instance . 197 Many policyholders cannot shift to another company 
without forfeiting some or all of the year's premium, and life insurance 
holders in particular may be unable to secure coverage elsewhere. 198 
Moreover, regulators can more easily freeze insurance policies than they 
can deposit accounts; in fact, they already do precisely this-both freezing 
accounts and providing exceptions in cases of hardship during the pendency 
of an insolvency proceeding. 199 
There also may be more leeway for meaningful reorganization in the 
insurance context. Unlike with bank depositors , for instance, one can even 
imagine at least a limited restructuring of the terms of insurance policies. 
A reorganization might adjust future premiums, for instance , although the 
scope of potential adjustment would need to be quite limited to minimize 
the likelihood of policyholder flight. 200 
As noted earlier, insurance regulators do effect what amounts to a 
reorganization-albeit a regulator driven one-in cases where they rehabil-
itate a troubled insurer. What the analysis thus far suggests is that 
lawmakers realistically could expand this option to provide for structured 
bargaining by the parties themselves. 
Much more than in the banking context, there are persuasive reasons 
to actually take this step. Permitting managers to remain in control 
initially and to frame the initial reorganization plan would give them an 
incentive to initiate insolvency proceedings in a timely fashion rather than 
invariably delaying . In addition, reorganization would offer the same kinds 
197. An insurance company's concern is that policyholders will shift their business to another 
company. Policyholder flight differs from a bank run in that policyholders, unlike bank depositors, 
do not acrually withdraw capital. Rather they decline to continue their relationship into the future . 
198. See Maisel et al., supra note 177, 178, § 2-2. 
199. See Blaine, supra note 35 , at 6-10 (defending the different treatment of insurance policies 
from deposit accounts and emphasizing the availability of hardship provisions); John N. Gavin , Issues 
Affecting State Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Coverage, in LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY INSOLVENCY 7-1, 7-10 to 7-11 (describing the power under NAIC Model Act§ 81 to impose 
a moratorium on payments of policy loans, cash values, or on "any other right to withdraw funds held 
in conjunction with policies or contracts, in addition to any contractual provisions for deferral of cash 
or policy loan value"). 
An obvious question with a reorganization option is how reorganization would interact with the 
guaranty funds. Although I will put this issue to the side in order to isolate the reorganization issue, 
it is worth noting that one could integrate the two schemes in a number of ways, such as requiring that 
any reorganization plan afford at least as much protection as the guaranty funds. Moreover, insurance 
regulators already negotiate with the funds in the rehabilitation context; and, as noted below, the issue 
is significantly reduced now that states have adopted policyholder priority provisions. 
200. Policy premiums could be adjusted toward the market rate , for instance, if the company had 
underpriced its policies. Insurers already make adjustments in the rehabilitation context. See, e.g., 
In re The Rehabilitation of Mutual Benefit Life Ins . Co ., No . C-91-00109 , 1993 N.J. Super. LEXIS 
940 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch . Div. Aug. 12, 1993) (confirming a rehabilitation plan that altered policy 
terms). Moreover, the widespread adoption of policyholder priority provisions, see, e.g., id. at *50-
54, will significantly reduce the need to scale down policyholders' claims since they now have priority 
status. 
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of benefits for insurance compames that it does for other troubled 
corporations, such as the possibility of preserving a viable company 's going 
concern surplus in contexts in which a third-party sale may not be realistic. 
Given these benefits, and the fact that insurance insolvencies already take 
more time than bank insolvencies and that regulators already freeze 
policies, the case for adding a reorganization option seems strong . 
To be sure, reorganization would raise several possible concerns. One 
obvious objection, as in the banking context, is that regulators would be 
too anxious to agree to a reorganization and to forestall a company's 
collapse rather than pushing for liquidation or a third-party sale when 
appropriate. Second, permitting reorganization might open the door to the 
same kinds of problems that commentators have criticized in Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the direct and indirect costs of time-
consuming bankruptcy cases. 201 
Neither of the objections undermines the case for reorganization, 
however. While regulator bias toward reorganization is a realistic concern, 
regulators already have a similar bias, and the benefits of adding this 
alternative appear to outweigh any additional bias against liquidation that 
the reform would entail. Similarly, the problems with the Chapter 11 
process are far from inevitable; 202 lawmakers could impose a strict time 
limit on the reorganization process, for instance, to reduce the perverse 
effects . 203 Cabining the reorganization process in this fashion also 
accords with the need to impose a moratorium on policy activity and the 
likelihood that the moratorium will only prove effective for a limited time. 
Thus, reorganization is appropriate for at least some insurers , but a 
final question is whether to limit the reorganization option in one of two 
ways: based on distinctions either between life and property insurers or 
between stock and mutual companies. As between life and property 
insurers, reorganization seems most promising for life insurers , as noted 
201. See Skeel, supra note 57, at 472-73, 472 n.24 (describing the costs and citing studies that 
attempt to quantify these costs) . 
202. Avoiding these problems may be the strongest argument for continuing to exclude insurance 
companies from the Bankruptcy Code, as noted earlier. See supra note 5. 
203. Several commentators have argued for such an approach in the corporate bankruptcy context. 
Robert Hansen and Randall Thomas have argued for a limited reorganization period, such as 120 days, 
followed by a mandatory auction. See Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas , Auctions in 
Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and Practical Guidance, 18 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN . (forthcoming 
1998); see also Skeel, supra note 57, at 514 (arguing for a fixed, 180 day exclusivity period). Perhaps 
more importantly, George Triantis's analysis of courts' approach to bankruptcy in Canada suggests that 
the excessive delay observed in United States cases is not inevitable. Canadian courts appear to screen 
debtors more carefully at the outset and quickly liquidate firms that do not appear likely to reorganize. 
See Lynn M . LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian 
Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J . 267, 287 (1994 ); George 
G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, 
Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 101, 109-11 (1996). 
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earlier, because many policyholders are locked in on a long-tenn basis and 
protecting them requires continuation of their policy. 204 Although 
property and casualty insurance tends to be more short term in nature, 
which may undermine the likelihood of effecting a reorganization, this will 
not always be true . Moreover, the limited duration of many property and 
casualty policies is misleading because policyholders tend not to switch 
companies often. These factors argue in favor of a reorganization option 
not only for life insurers , but also for property and casualty insurers. 
With respect to the stock-mutual distinction, nothing in the 
reorganization context turns on whether shareholders or some other constit-
uency is entitled to the residual value of the firm. Thus, the reorganization 
option should be available to both stock and mutual insurance companies . 
VI. Conclusion 
In both banking and insurance, the insolvency process has long been 
treated as the exclusive domain of regulators. The bank and insurance 
failures of the 1980s, and questions about regulators' handling of the 
failures, have led both to calls for reform and to actual reform. Yet the 
reform has tended to be more of the same-that is, retaining regulator 
hegemony, but attempting to force regulators to act more expeditiously, 
principally through command-and-control legislation. 
This Article has argued that lawmakers should take a different tack . 
Rather than continuing to rely solely on regulators, they should authorize 
managers (and also creditors) to initiate a bank or insurance insolvency 
proceeding . An obvious problem with managerial initiation is the near 
certainty that managers will be ousted in an insolvency proceeding, which 
undermines their willingness to contribute to the decision. To counteract 
this disincentive, lawmakers should relax the presumption that managers 
will be terminated after initiation. By facilitating firms' use of incentives 
such as phantom debt or shareholder bonuses lawmakers could further 
encourage managers to contribute to the initiation decision.205 The 
204. Notice that the lock-in effect is thus both a problem in the governance context, see 
Hansmann, supra note 136, at 145-46 (suggesting that the use of the mutual form in the life insurance 
context is in pan a response to asymmetric information and lock-in effects), and an advantage for 
reorganization. 
205. Assuming that regulators retain ultimate control of the disposition decision, one potential 
concern is whether managers' uncenainty about whether regulators will choose liquidation or a purchase 
and assumption would adversely affect the initiation decision. Given that the going concern surplus 
will be smaller in a liquidation than if the bank is sold intact, managers might postpone initiation if they 
fear that regulators will end up liquidating the bank. 
One can imagine ways to correct for this possibility. Lawmakers might provide for a larger 
amount of phantom debt or a higher-percentage bonus in the liquidation context , for instance, to offset 
the lower surplus. But the simpler response is that the concern does not seem likely to be a serious 
one in practice . Given that regulators prefer to sell a troubled bank intact, they seem unlikely to opt 
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analysis also has suggested important changes to the existing disposition 
options. Although traditional reorganization is relatively unattractive in the 
banking context, permitting managers to propose prepackaged purchase and 
assumption transactions could help facilitate beneficial mergers. With 
insurance companies, adding a traditional reorganization option would both 
encourage managerial initiation and enhance the disposition process. 
On the surface, the reforms I have advocated are quite dramatic . Yet 
the reforms not only would fit easily within the existing, regulator-driven 
regime, but they also accord with pronounced trends in bank and insurance 
regulation. In recent years, the banking and insurance markets have 
become increasingly competitive, and regulators have gradually relaxed the 
restrictions on healthy firms in response to these changes. As banks and 
insurance companies become more and more like other firms, their treat-
ment in insolvency seems destined to move in this direction as well: from 
the traditional, closed world of regulator hegemony to a process influenced 
much more by market forces and the parties themselves, along much the 
same lines as I have argued for in this Article . In the long run at least, I 
like to think that the analysis of this Article therefore has history on its 
side. 
for liquidation when purchase and assumption is a realistic possibility . In consequence, lawmakers need 
not explicitly adjust the phantom debt or bonus to account for the nature of the ultimate disposition 
decision. In fact, the possibility that regulators may be unable to effect a P&A if managers wait too 
long to file should reinforce managers' incentive to file promptly. 
